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Problem Description 
There is an increasing interest in the development of distributed generation (DG) in Norway as a 
result of significant water and wind energy potentials and green certificates. In the distribution grid it 
is primarily small-scale hydroelectric power that is used in distributed generation, but small-scale 
wind power is also relevant. New DG units will be installed in areas that already have high 
penetration of distributed generation, in networks without current production or in areas where 
there is no power grid at all. Small-scale hydro and wind power is unregulated production, and when 
errors occur in the grid it is required of DG units to disconnect from the network. This implicates that 
they can’t effortlessly be utilized as a reserve supply when disruptions occur. DG is also a source of 
errors in itself (from errors occurring in the device itself or as a result of capacity problems) that may 
result in disconnection of both production and the associated grid resulting in increased disruption to 
end users. Increasing the proportion of DG in combination with smart solutions for the distribution 
network can, on the other hand, lead to new opportunities. In fallout situations, using controlled 
island mode on device(s) that are regulated can provide power locally when the network loses the 
connection to the underlying network or when errors occur in the distribution network itself. 
 
In this thesis the objective is to analyze how distributed production affects delivery reliability, for 
example the number and duration of interruptions. The reliability calculations are to be carried out in 
PowerFactory for realistic distribution grids resulting in the estimated reliability of delivery in today's 
operations. Similarly the grid will be modeled in PowerFactory when taking advantage of the 
opportunities for controlled islanding in a future grid. 
 
The problem description is as follows: 
 Familiarize with the following: 
o Technical requirements for the connection of distributed generation in the current 
grid 
o Issues regarding driving forces, challenges, and opportunities with distributed 
generation in the current system and in future power systems with emphasis on 
reliability  
 Analyze how reliability of supply is affected by distributed generation with the current 
operation of distribution grids 
 Describe the prerequisites for being able to run controlled islanding in a faulted grid and 
research into what has been experienced in cases where islanding mode of DG units has been 
allowed   
 Analyze how reliability of supply is affected by a future network operation scheme where DG 
units are properly equipped to operate in controlled islanding mode for different networks  
 Make comparisons and evaluate with respect to distributed generations impact on reliability 
of supply 
 Describe how reliability analysis in principle is computed in PowerFactory, what assumptions 
are made for the analysis and the challenges faced by PowerFactory users (including practical 
hints and tips for the analysis) 
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Abstract 
As a consequence of increased government efforts to reduce local Norwegian    -emissions the 
development of small distributed generators have increased. This development is assumed to 
continue, but at an increasing incremental cost due to the inferior profitability of remaining prospects. 
To maintain profitability of smaller and high cost distributed generators, cost savings must be 
implemented. Quality of supply is a significant factor in determining potential profitability. Hence, a 
significant potential in cost reduction lies in increasing quality of supply. This can be achieved by 
utilizing the decentralized nature of these power producers by enabling intended island operation. By 
enabling these generators to run in intended island mode, they are able to supply their local grid with 
power when fallout of the main grid or other components occurs. This increases the uptime for local 
customers and therefore increases quality of supply.  
Five different grids are modeled in PowerFactory based on collected empirical data for the evaluation 
of the potential for islanding in Norway. With these models different cases utilizing islanding schemes 
are simulated and the reliability of these configurations compared to a base case representing normal 
operations. The results from this analysis suggest big reductions in the reliability indices “Energy Not 
Supplied” and “System Average Interruption Frequency” are possible. In the thesis the reductions 
achieved are in the 10%-60% range of the base case. The estimated savings earned from increased 
reliability of supply does not justify the assumed investment needed, but the numbers are not 
conclusive. Better estimates of expenses and assessing other grids with better prerequisites for 
islanding could indicate to be profitability. 
  
iii 
 
Sammendrag 
Som en konsekvens av økte statlige innsatsen for å redusere lokale norske    -utslipp har 
utbyggingen av små distribuerte generatorer har økt. Denne utviklingen antas å fortsette, men med 
en økende marginalkostnad på grunn av dårligere lønnsomhet for gjenværende prospekter. For å 
opprettholde lønnsomheten av distribuerte generatorer, må kostnadsbesparelser iverksettes. 
Leveringskvalitet er en vesentlig faktor i å bestemme potensiell lønnsomhet. Derfor ligger det et 
betydelig potensial i kostnadsreduksjon ved å øke leveringspåliteligheten. Dette kan oppnås ved å 
utnytte den desentraliserte naturen til disse kraftprodusentene ved at de gjøres i stand til å operere i 
planlagt øydrift. Ved å tilrettelegge disse generatorene for intendert øydrift, vil de være i stand til å 
levere strøm lokalt når utfall av sentralnettet eller andre komponenter oppstår. Dette øker 
oppetiden for lokale kunder og dermed også leveringspåliteligheten. 
Fem ulike nett er modellert i PowerFactory, basert på innsamlede empiriske data, for vurdering av 
potensialet for øydrift i Norge. I disse modellene er ulike caser ment for å representere aspekter ved 
øydrift implementert og en pålitelighetsanalyse av disse er utført. Påliteligheten av disse 
konfigurasjonene vil bli sammenlignet med en «base case» som representerer normal drift av nettet. 
Resultatene fra denne analysen tyder på store reduksjoner i pålitelighet indeksene "Energy Not 
Supplied" og "System Average Interuption Frequency" er mulig. I avhandlingen oppnådde man 
reduksjoner som lå på 10%-60% av «base case»-indeksene. De estimerte besparelsene fra økt 
forsyningssikkerhet rettferdiggjør ikke de antatte investeringene som trengs, men tallene er ikke 
konkluderende. Bedre estimater på kostnader og vurderinger av andre nett med bedre 
forutsetninger for øydrift kan vise seg å indikere lønnsomhet. 
  
iv 
 
Preface 
This Master Thesis is written at the Department of Electric Power Engineering in the Norwegian 
University of Science and Technology (NTNU) during the spring semester, 2012. The theme of this 
project was suggested by Gerd Kjølle at SINTEF Energi AS and was a continuation from my autumn 
semester 2011. The intention of the thesis was both to make preliminary evaluations of the 
possibility of islanding generators in Norway, as well as researching into what was already known 
about this in other countries and to better understand the PowerFactory tool. Supervision of the 
thesis was done by Gerd Kjølle and Tarjei Solvang.  
I would like to thank the DIgSILENT support team and especially Désirée Bangert for tirelessly 
answering questions about the workings of PowerFactory. Thanks also to Traian Preda for taking with 
him questions and bringing back answers from DIgSILENT conventions in Germany and for helping 
me work out load flow problems. Rune Paulsen deserves mention for digging up all kinds of numbers 
and datasets. Oddbjørn Gjerde for helping me out with license issues with DIgSILENT. All Woodruff 
and all the other involved at BC Hydro for digging up ancient reports on the Boston Bar system. 
Lastly, thanks to Rolf Erlend Grundt at Agder Energi for pushing the grid strategy department to 
produce previously unavailable statistics.  
 
Anders Hegvik 
June 22, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
v 
 
Definitions 
Deep connection tariff/costs The tariff charged by the grid company to 
the DG operator covers all the expenses 
that the grid company incurs due to the 
connection of the DG. 
(1) 
DG unit According to Statnett they understand 
DG units as all equipment that is 
connected on/off the distribution grid by 
the same circuit breaker (or similar 
device). DG units include generators and 
eventually transformers with its 
respective control system. If the DG unit 
consists of several generators the DG 
units the DG unit’s maximum active 
power production is understood as the 
sum of all the generators maximum 
active power production. 
(2) 
ELMEK (Electromagnetic 
Installation) 
Mechanical and electronic installation 
that has implications for the DG units’ 
grid connection. Ex. Turbine, generator, 
transformer, relay and cables. 
(3) 
Intentional islanding Intentional islanding is a planned or non-
planned state where one or more DG 
units supply a part of the distribution grid 
that is isolated from the rest of the grid. 
(3) 
Interruption An event that causes a relay to trip the 
circuit breaker zone and disconnection of 
a component for more than three 
minutes. 
 
IPP (Independent Power 
Producer) 
A person, organization or company that is 
licensed and operates a generator to feed 
power into the grid. 
 
IPS (Islanding Power System) A power system that is isolated from the 
main grid but is supplied by one or more 
DG units. 
(2) 
Modeling Scenario (Case) A network topology combined with a set 
of analysis settings intended to simulate a 
specific real life scenario. 
 
Nominal Voltage (  ) The rated voltage for a component or 
grid section of a grid. 
 
Production Unit Production unit is understood to be any 
rotating machine (turbine or generator) 
or any converter with production behind 
it  
(2) 
REN (Rasjonell Elektrisk Nettdrift)  www.ren.no 
Sectioning The operation of locating a faulted 
component in a de-energized grid, 
disconnect it using the nearest 
disconnectors and close the tripped 
circtuit breaker. 
 
vi 
 
Sectioning Time The duration from when the circuit 
breaker is tripped to when it is re-closed 
again. 
 
Shallow connection tariff/costs The connection tariff charged by the grid 
operator to the DG operator only covers 
the costs of connection between the 
location of the DG and the nearest point 
of the grid with an appropriate voltage 
level , independent of whether or not the 
grid at this location has sufficient capacity 
to transport the DG’s power output or 
not. 
(1) 
Topology Contribution/Topology 
ENS 
Loosely: the part of an index (i.e. ENS) 
that is caused by the topology. Normally, 
for ENS, this would be all contributions 
apart from external grid contribution and 
sectioning time contribution.   
Self-defined 
Unintentional Islanding A non-intended state where one or more 
DG units supply a part of the distribution 
grid that is not connected to the rest of 
the grid. 
(3) 
LP (Load Point) Any constellation of loads consuming 
active and reactive power from the same 
feeder. 
 
Circuit Breaker Failure Rate The probability of a circuit breaker to not 
properly open when a fault occurs within 
its circuit breaker zone. 
 
Circuit Breaker Zone The zone in which faults in any of the 
components are tripped by the same 
circuit breakers.  
Self-defined 
External Grid In this thesis normally refers to the 
connection point where the transmission 
or regional grid is connected to the grid 
being discussed or modeled. Normally 
functions as an infinite bus. 
 
Voltage Band Upper and lower boundary for the 
connected components (usually a DG 
unit) voltage in the connection point.  
(3) 
Interruption Frequency,   The frequency of interruptions on a 
component or grid in [1/a] 
 
Interruption Duration,   The average time a component is 
disconnected from the grid once an 
interruption occurs in [h] 
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1. Introduction 
There is an increasing interest in the development of distributed generation (DG) in Norway as a 
result of significant water and wind energy potentials and green certificates. In the distribution grid it 
is primarily small-scale hydroelectric power that is used in distributed generation, but small-scale 
wind power is also relevant. New DG units will be installed in areas that already have high 
penetration of distributed generation, in networks without current production or in areas where 
there is no power grid at all. Small-scale hydro and wind power is unregulated production, and when 
errors occur in the grid it is required of DG units to disconnect from the network. This implicates that 
they can’t effortlessly be utilized as a reserve supply when disruptions occur. DG is also a source of 
errors in itself (from errors occurring in the device itself or as a result of capacity problems) that may 
result in disconnection of both production and the associated grid resulting in increased disruption to 
end users. Increasing the proportion of DG in combination with smart solutions for the distribution 
network can, on the other hand, lead to new opportunities. In fallout situations, using controlled 
island mode on device(s) that are regulated can provide power locally when the network loses the 
connection to the underlying network or when errors occur in the distribution network itself. 
 
In this thesis the objective is to analyze how distributed production affects delivery reliability, for 
example the number and duration of interruptions. The reliability calculations are to be carried out in 
PowerFactory for realistic distribution grids resulting in the estimated reliability of delivery in today's 
operations. Similarly the grid will be modeled in PowerFactory when taking advantage of the 
opportunities for controlled islanding in a future grid. 
 
The problem description is as follows: 
 Familiarize with the following: 
o Technical requirements for the connection of distributed generation in the current 
grid 
o Issues regarding driving forces, challenges, and opportunities with distributed 
generation in the current system and in future power systems with emphasis on 
reliability  
 Analyze how reliability of supply is affected by distributed generation with the current 
operation of distribution grids 
 Describe the prerequisites for being able to run controlled islanding in a faulted grid and 
research into what has been experienced in cases where islanding mode of DG units has been 
allowed   
 Analyze how reliability of supply is affected by a future network operation scheme where DG 
units are properly equipped to operate in controlled islanding mode for different networks  
 Make comparisons and evaluate with respect to distributed generations impact on reliability 
of supply 
 Describe how reliability analysis in principle is computed in PowerFactory, what assumptions 
are made for the analysis and the challenges faced by PowerFactory users (including practical 
hints and tips for the analysis) 
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Structure of the report 
Chapter 1 introduces the thesis and the problems it aims to solve. Chapter 2 explains the theoretical 
background starting with an outline on the legal system. Then it presents the empirical facts that are 
known about islanding of generators. Lastly it defines and explains the breed of reliability theory 
employed in this thesis. Chapter 3 presents the test cases and comments on how the analysis was 
done. Chapter 4 discusses the overall result of the test case results. Chapter 5 concludes the master 
with suggestions of what could have been done in continuation of this thesis.  
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2. Theoretical Background 
 
2.1 Legal framework for grid connection in Norway 
The laws under which IPPs have to comply in Norway are quite strict compared to international 
standards. Below a summary that contains the laws detailing legal obligations for all operators in the 
Norwegian power grid is included. There are also more specific guidelines enacted for DG power 
suppliers, which will be the main focus for this chapter. 
2.1.1 The Energy Law 
- LOV 1990-06-29 nr. 50: Lov om produksjon, omforming, overføring, omsetning og bruk av 
energi m.m. (energiloven). 
- FOR-1990-12-07 nr. 959: Forskrift om produksjon, omforming, overføring, omsetning, 
fordeling og bruk av energi m.m. (energilovforskriften). 
- FOR 1999-03-11 nr. 302: Forskrift om økonomisk og teknisk rapportering, inntektsramme for 
nettvirksomheten og tariffer. 
- FOR-2004-11-30 nr. 1557: Forskrifter om leveringskvalitet i kraftsystemet. 
- FOR-1999-03-11 nr. 301: Forskrift om måling, avregning og samordnet opptreden ved 
kraftomsetning og fakturering av nettjenester. 
- FIKS – Funksjonskrav i kraftsystemet. 
- Statnetts praktisering av systemansvaret. 
2.1.2 The Electric Monitoring Law 
- LOV-1929-05-24 nr. 4 Lov om tilsyn med elektriske anlegg og elektrisk utstyr (El-tilsynsloven) 
- FOR-2005-12-20 nr. 1626 Forskrift om elektriske forsyningsanlegg 
- FOR-1998-11-06 nr. 1060 Forskrift om elektriske lavspenningsanlegg. 
- FOR-2006-04-28 nr. 458: Forskrift om sikkerhet ved arbeid i og drift av elektriske anlegg.  
- FOR-1005-03-01 nr. 190: Forskrifter om kvalifikasjoner for elektrofagfolk. 
- FOR-2002-11-22 nr. 1323: Forskrift om registrering av virksomheter som prosjekterer, utfører 
og vedlikeholder elektriske anlegg. 
2.1.3 The Labour Laws 
- FOR-1998-10-30 nr. 1048: Forskrift om sikkerhet ved arbeid i og drift av høyspenningsanlegg. 
These are collected from the technical Sintef report “Technical guidance for connection of generation 
with maximum effect active power production less than 10MW to distribution grid” (4) and the REN 
(5) standard. The most important and defining of these laws is the energy law mentioned first on the 
list. However, the focus will be on the REN guidelines for DG power suppliers as they also cover the 
requirements listed in the energy law and are updated regularly.   
2.1.4 KILE and Compensation for Energy Not Delivered in Norway 
Since 2001 there has been a compensation requirement for net operators in Norway (6). If the net 
operator fails to deliver energy as per the agreement with the customer the operator has to 
compensate the customer according to the FASIT calculations of cost to society. This compensation 
only regards interruptions of duration over 3 minutes and is set according to table 2.1. 
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Customer group Cost function for kP,ref  Unit 
 
All durations 
 
Agricultural 10,6 · r + 4 kr/kW 
Households 8,8 · r + 1 kr/kW 
  0-4 timer > 4 timer   
Industry 55,6 · r + 17 18,4 · r + 166 kr/kW 
Sales and Service 97,5 · r + 20 33,1 · r + 280 kr/kW 
Public Sector 14,6 · r + 1 4,1 · r + 44 kr/kW 
Lumber mills and Power Intensive Industry 7,7 · r + 6 3,1 · r + 23 kr/kW 
Table 2.1 - Interruption Costs According to Norwegian Regulations 
Here r is the time in hours,         specific cost in 2006 Norwegian Kroner adjusted by the consumer 
price index. Different costs apply to warned outages due to maintenance. These compensation costs 
are also adjusted by a correction factor which adjusts for the time of day and the month and how the 
sector is considered to be hit by the timing of the outage. As an example, the public sector is deemed 
only to get a 60% compensation if an outage occurs in July. If the outage happens on a Sunday in July 
the public sector can only demand 24% compensation. However, these correction factors will not be 
detailed here but can be found in the Forskrift om økonomisk og teknisk rapportering, inntektsramme 
for nettvirksomheten og tariffer (6). To calculate KILE costs in this paper the NVE simplification for 
economic and technical reporting is used (7). Adjusted for CPI (Consumer Price Index) the formula is 
shown below.  
                        
       
       
 
Here            as per 2008 prices and CPI is the consumer price index as per the SSB (8).     
2.2 General Norwegian Connection Requirements for DG Units 
This chapter will outline the main requirements for non-islanding requirements suggested by REN for 
DG units in the distribution grid.  The main criterion stated in the law and in Statnetts “Funksjonskrav 
I Kraftsystemet” (FoK) (2) is that the DG unit shall be configured for the conditions at the connection 
point. More specifically this means that the DG unit shall have impedance values and other 
important generator parameters adapted for the connection point. If needed, the DG unit must also 
have a regulation system for active effect, reactive effect and voltage. All these solutions must also 
be configured to collaborate with tap-changing maneuvers and other generators in the grid. Errors in 
the grid can’t be ruled out when adjusting relay settings for the DG unit protection systems.     
2.2.1 DG Unit Voltage Requirements 
The DG unit requirement on voltage quality is defined by the net operator to which it supplies power. 
There are two main requirements to voltage. One is the voltage band, and the other is the agreed 
upon output voltage of the generator. The voltage band is set by the net operator after they’ve done 
an assessment of the DG units’ impact in the surround grid. Output voltage of the generator,       ,  
is then agreed upon between the owner of the generator and the net operator.  From this, a 
            and a       are defined, as per Forskrift om leveringskvalitet i kraftsystemet (9).  
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Where             and        are effective voltage changes evaluated each 10 ms between time 
periods where the voltage has been stable in minimum one second. The voltage is considered stable 
when it does not change more than 0.5% of        per second. These values are then constrained as 
shown on table 2.2. 
Voltage Jumps at Connection Point Number of allowed daily incidents 
                3 
         3 
Table 2.2 - Allowed voltage jumps at connection point (10) 
Protection mechanism settings must trip if the voltages described in table 2.3 are measured at the 
connection point. 
DG unit is connected to: Voltage band in p.u.on nominal base   Max. disconnection duration [s] 
Low Voltage Net U>1.15 0.2 
U>1.1 1.5 
U<0.85 1.5 
U<0.5 0.2 
High Voltage Net U>1.15 0.2 
U>1.06 1.5 
U<0.85 1.5 
U<0.5 0.2 
Table 2.3 - Required DG Unit Protection Equipment Response to Voltage Measurement at Connection Point 
These are the DG units’ legal obligations to the net operator. The net operator then has the 
responsibility to set these values in a way that ensures that the end user has a stationary voltage 
band of +/- 10%. This is also suggested in a report from SINTEF (4) to be limited to a +8% / -6,5% 
band on stationary voltage delivered to consumers in the same grid as the DG unit. 
2.2.2 Harmonics 
The requirements regarding harmonics control are somewhat more extensive than what is necessary 
for this paper and will not be covered in great detail here. Generally the generator shall not 
contribute so that the individual boundaries displayed in table 2.4 for over harmonic voltages in the 
connection point are breached. All the values displayed in table 2.4 are averaged over ten minutes 
(10). 
Odd harmonic Even harmonic 
Not Multiple of 3 Multiple of 3   
Orden h Uh Orden h Uh Orden h Uh 
5 6,00 % 3 5,00 % 2 2,00 % 
7 5,00 % 9 1,50 % 4 1,00 % 
11 3,50 % > 9 0,50 % > 4 0,50 % 
13 3,00 %         
17 2,00 %         
19, 23, 25 1,50 %         
> 25 1,00 %         
Table 2.4 - Boundry Levels for Allowed Harmonic Voltages at Connection Point, as sited in (9) 
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2.2.3 Fibrillation 
Net operators are obligated to supply power within the following limits. It is the net operators’ 
responsibility to ensure that the DG unit does not contribute to such conditions.  
  0,23≤UN ≤35 35 < UN Time interval 
Fibrillation short term intensity, Pst [pu] 1,2 1 95% of the week 
Fibrillation long term intensity, Plt [pu] 1 0,8 100% of the week 
 
2.2.4 Frequency 
The only requirement to a DG unit when it comes to frequency is that when the DG unit experiences 
abnormal frequencies, the DG unit must be tripped. This is not set by Norwegian law, but is listed as 
a requirement in RENs agreement framework. The conditions and requirements of such a situation 
are listed in table 2.5. It is also added that if the net operator demands it, the upper frequency bound 
should be reduced. 
Frequency Band [Hz] Max. disconnection 
duration [s] 
f>51 0,2 
f<48 0,2 
Table 2.5- Required protection response to abnormal frequency at measurement point 
The appointed (“systemansvarlig”) is required by law to preserve a frequency that is “normally” 
within +/- 2% of 50 Hz. 
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2.3 Introduction to Distributed Generation and Islanding 
 
In 2008 the Norwegian parliament reached an agreement on a climate proposition which committed 
Norway to cut national carbon emissions by 2030. This deal also stressed that two thirds of the 
emission reductions has to come “from home”.  When looking at how Norway can fulfill these targets 
and also manage to provide for the increased power demand of the future there are a few options. 
The profitable and sizable hydro power resources are all developed. Reducing demand by increasing 
the energy efficiency of buildings and redirecting electricity consumption away from heating 
purposes are good measures, but they are not enough to fulfill the 2030 targets. An array of different 
measures has to be set in motion if we hope to reach the goals set in the climate report from 2008, 
among these is development of distributed energy resources. In 2008 the potential for distributed 
electricity production was estimated to be around 18 TWh/a. In the new climate report from the 
government which was published in 2012 the estimate is increased to 28 TWh/a with a production 
cost of less than or equal to 3 NOK/kWh (11). This is a 22.6% increase from the 124 TWh/a we are 
currently consuming and could be enough to cover some of our increased demand for electrical 
energy in the near future. 3 NOK/kWh is, however in another order of magnitude than what is 
normally paid for electricity in Norway (between 20 and 30 øre/kWh according to Nordpool). This 
discrepancy in price is mostly subsidized by the “green certificates” scheme for renewable energy.  
Since most of these distributed resources are close to distribution grids the distribution grids are also 
their most natural point of connection. This poses technical difficulties as the distribution grids in 
Norway were often built some time ago, and not with the intention of exporting power into the 
transmission grid. These technical difficulties include new and unintended voltage profiles in radials, 
protection systems that are not meant for two way transport of power and thermal limits in lines 
that are exceeded because of new load flow dynamics. Today net operators are responsible by law to 
upgrade grids and facilitate for new approved DG units that are to be introduced into their 
distribution grids. The cost of implementing DG units is therefore passed on to the consumers.  
It is a benefit from DG that power is produced closer to the customer and will result in less line loss 
and potentially less infrastructure upgrades, thus reducing costs for the net operator and customer. 
The size of the generators makes them ideal for assembly line production. Potential for exploiting 
economies of scale while producing these units is therefore big. As capital costs are often the main 
expense for DG operators’ cheap production is important for DG profitability. 
A number of possibilities have been proposed to smooth the introduction of distributed generation 
in the Norwegian distribution grids. For example, in older radials that are no longer properly 
dimensioned for the loads they are carrying, the introduction of one or more DG units further out in 
the line could improve low voltage issues. In specific cases thermal limits of the line could also be 
alleviated if the DG unit has a sufficiently stable output all through the year. However, this is 
normally not the case as DG units are often hydro based generators with low output during winter 
when demand is peaking. Until now commissions for regulating river runs with dams have not 
commonly been granted by NVE as a cautious measure to not disturb ecosystems and general 
environment in the developed area. In an e-mail conversation with NVE they said that NVE would be 
open to commission damming river runs if it was documented low impact on surroundings and 
ecosystems and a sufficient improvement to DG operations could be documented. However, they 
also noted that the size of the dams normally requested were not sufficient to perform long term 
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islanding operations (12). This paper will discuss islanding at length later on, but in short this means 
enabling radials to be supplied with energy from DG units when the main grid is unavailable. 
 There are also ambitions for enabling DG units to operate in intended island modes. The benefits of 
managing to do this are many. A radial with a functioning islanding system could potentially reduce 
the costs imposed on net operators substantially. As per Norwegian law, the net operator has to 
reimburse the customer for energy not supplied.  
Most radials consist mostly of households, which receives the smallest reimbursement rate of all the 
rate categories. Even so, the reduction in energy loss could still amount to sufficient amounts to 
improve the margins of a DG unit scheme. And if a radial with agricultural, industrial or private 
businesses there are big possibilities for reducing costs. These savings could not only apply for the 
net operator, but businesses who are focused on IT and other activities sensitive to blackouts could 
receive imperative improvements to reliability of supply. 
As a part of a smart grid concept which can react intelligently to information gathered in other parts 
of the grid more elaborate schemes could be implemented. For example, it has been suggested that 
islanding enabled zones or radials in a national power grid could help prevent cascading blackouts 
(13). Mainly by creating low threshold load shedding options, but also as a part of a more advanced 
control architecture which divides power systems into zones. Another concept being discussed is 
using these islanded zones to help synchronize and black start a grid once a blackout has occurred. 
Some of these concepts are mentioned in the government statement Energi- og Kraftbalansen mot 
2020 (14).  
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2.4 BC Hydro Islanding Practices 
BC Hydro, one of the largest electrical utilities in Canada, is a company which has employed islanding 
practices for some of their rural feeders. The first and most notable of these is the feeder branching 
off from Hope and supplying the Boston Bar radial. This 
distribution system has 12 kV, 25 kV and 34,5 kV DG units 
installed throughout the radial. Most of these are run-of-
the-river hydro generators with capacities of between 1 
and 15 MW. This line is mostly built off the highway and 
runs through a steep canyon. As a consequence of this 
the line is frequently subjected to rock-, mud- and snow 
slides. Accessing the line for maintenance and repairs is 
difficult because of the terrain. On average the line 
experiences two 12-20 hours outages a year (1). Because 
of this BC hydro decided to implement islanding as a way 
to improve the reliability of the local power supply in 
Boston Bar. This pioneer project has resulted in a paper 
named “Distribution Power Generator Islanding 
Guideline” (15) and later a report was written on the 
results of the Boston Bar Islanding implementation (16).   
2.4.1 Distribution Equipment Requirements to 
Feeders with Islanding Possibilities  
The distribution system contains overhead and 
underground equipment and operates at 35 kV and 
below. In 2009 the DG size was limited to 17MVA at 
25kV. The thermal capacity for primary feeder 
conductors or cables has to be verified for the 
implementation of any DG rated above 1MVA. Voltage 
regulators also have to be refitted or replaced for the 
new voltage profile and they have to be capable of 
reversed power sensing and two-way tap-changing 
operations. This is because the line set-up of voltage 
regulators normally is intended for one-way supply of 
power to the customer. A one-way power flow drastically 
reduces the set of acceptable operational scenarios for 
the equipment in question, and can therefor run on 
simpler protection systems. Potential fault currents may 
also increase, so a review of the relay ratings in the feeder must be conducted. Reclosers must be 
refitted or replaced if their protection systems are not coordinated with both normal operations and 
islanding practices, as a recloser closing when islanding operation is engaged could be dangerous and 
harm equipment.  
Map 1 – Boston Bar feeder branching of from 
Hope 
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Map 2 - Boston Bar islanding system (17) 
2.4.2 Requirements to Generators in Islanding Operations According to BC Hydro 
The heuristics developed at BC Hydro for assessing whether a DG can inadvertently hold an island on 
its own is called the “two-to-one” rule. This rule suggests that “an island is not sustainable where the 
annual minimum load in the island is at least twice the maximum generation capacity” (15). This is to 
preserve a sufficient reserve to maintain the frequency. In a thesis by Yu Chen (13) this is expanded 
on and nuanced. The thesis argues that in a load system with high penetration of electrical motors 
(pumps and fans etc.) would have a more dynamic and softer response to a rapid change in load or 
production within the system. This is because electrical motors would respond to a reduction in 
system frequency by reducing their own output mechanical frequency, thus reducing their power 
consumption. The effect can be shown by comparing equation (1) and equation (2). Equation (1) is 
the normal swing equation, and equation (2) is modified to introduce the effect of electrical motors. 
Here D is the electrical motor dampening coefficient.   
  
   
  
          (1) 
  
   
  
             (2) 
In these equations the H represents system inertia,    is the change in system frequency and    is 
the drop in power due to an incident. 
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Considering this an industrial islanded power system with a high penetration of electrical motors 
could give a dampening effect on frequency changes thus making the whole system more stable. 
Alternatively, the industrial process could be very sensitive to frequency changes and therefore not 
suited for exposure to a more unstable frequency.  
BC Hydro argues that since a smaller power system tends to have less stiffness, these considerations 
are particularly important when planning an IPS. 
 
2.4.3 Generator Ride Trough or Load Pick-up   
When the protection relay of the islanded feeder is opened due to failure in the feeder or some 
other reason, there are two options on how to restore power in the IPS suggested by BC Hydro. If the 
IPS is equipped with a “ride-trough” system the prime mover of the IPS receives a signal from the 
now open protection relay indicating a switch from constant power to load-following isochronous 
control mode. The generator then attempts to maintain voltage and power flow into the island. If the 
generator can’t do this, a synchronous relay opening of all the generators in the IPS will be executed, 
thus blacking out the whole island. If this happens, or the IPS does not contain a ride-through system, 
a black start is attempted. The system will be checked to see if the generators present and 
operational in the system have the capacity to maintain the total load in the IPS. This is done either 
manually or by an automated check of governor, controls, exciter and inertia to see if the generators 
can pick up and hold the dead feeder load. If so, a black start is attempted. If not, a manual or 
automated load shed or sectionalizing procedure is required (16).  
2.4.4 Protection Coordination  
The main change in overcurrent protection relays in the feeder is 
that they must be bi-directional. This is because they have to be 
able to switch between exporting power and importing power. 
There also has to be some kind of synchronization is needed to 
switch relays from normal feeder operations to islanding 
operations.  This control can again be a manually triggered system 
(for example by a telephone call) or an automated signaling 
system.  
 
2.4.5 Canadian requirements 
When comparing Canadian and Norwegian standards for quality of 
supply the general Canadian law regarding this will not be 
elaborated on. The net operator, BC Hydro, in the Boston Bar 
region has been permitted to outline their own requirements in 
collaboration with the local government. The following tables 
outline the sort of power quality BC Hydro normally operates with 
and the sort of power quality they can supply in different stages of 
islanding mode. 
 
Figure 2.1 - Protection coordination 
illustration 
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Under/Over Frequency as per Canadian Nominal Standards 
 Nominal  Instantaneous Trip As percentage Delay Trip (1 sec) 
Grid-connected 60 Hz 59.5 Hz > f, f > 60.5 Hz +/- 0.83% Not Applicable 
Dead Load Pickup 60 Hz 55 Hz > f, f  > 65 Hz +/- 8.33% Not Applicable 
Island Steady State 60 Hz 53 Hz > f, f > 67 Hz +/- 11.67% 59.5 Hz > f, f > 60.5 Hz 
Table 2.6 - Under and over frequency standards in Canada 
Under/Over Voltage as per Canadian Nominal Standards 
 Continous Range Delay (1sec) As Percentage 
V[p.u. ](any phase) 0.9 <V< 1.1 0.9 <V< 1.1 +/- 10% 
Table 2.7 - Under and over voltage standards in Canada 
2.4.6 Boston Bar Islanding Results 
The Boston Bar project will be briefly introduced. The one line schematics are presented in figure 2.2 
below. The financing of the Boston Bar is done by BC Hydro through paying the IPP a bonus when it is 
able to sustain the island during an outage. This is paid as a compensation for its incremental capital 
cost for islanding capability. The incremental capital cost was about $500,000 CDN on a capital cost 
base of $12 million CDN. 
 
Figure 2.2 - One line schematics for Boston Bar 
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The reliability improvements shown below are the ones presented by BC hydro themselves. It shows 
the average for that region as presented by the Canadian Energy Association (CEA) compared to what 
BC Hydro (BCH) achieved at the Boston Bar with the islanding system. Curiously enough the BC Hydro 
report (15) presenting these results does not do a before and after evaluation. But the resulting SAIFI 
and SAIDI shows roughly half the average interruption frequency and half the average interruption 
duration.  
Year 
SAIFI SAIDI 
BCH CEA BCH CEA 
2000 1,22 2,59 2,28 4,31 
2001 1,18 2,26 2,51 3,23 
2002 1,41 2,41 3,6 3,67 
2003 1,45 2,33 3,77 4,06 
2004 1,63 2,67 4,51 10,65 
2005 1,47 1,98 3,96 3,95 
Table 2.8 - The reliability indices for BC Hydro islanding scheme compared to Canadian Energy Association 
 
2.4.7 Boston Bar Islanding Guidelines 
When the islanding capability was implemented in Boston Bar, eight points had to be conducted 
according to the BC Hydro summary report (17).  
1. Automatic Voltage Regulators (AVR) 
Voltage regulation must be a priority for DGs when operating in an island as there is no other entity 
inclining the voltage to stay within island standards. The exciters also had to have positive field 
forcing for current boost during feeder outage in order to assist overcurrent protection.  
2. Black Start Capability 
A 55kW diesel aggregate provides the Boston Bar island black start capability. This is for situations 
where the ride through isn’t able to stay within limits and generators have to be tripped.  
3. Engineered Mass for Turbines and Generators 
This is done to increase the system inertia, H [MWsec/MVA] as described by the swing equation (1).  
This is intended to increase the stiffness in the IPS by reducing the impact of droop in production on 
the initial slope of the frequency change, as demonstrated in equation (3). 
  
  
 
  
  
      (3) 
A small power system tends to have less stability with regards to frequency. This will be discussed in 
more detail in the discussion of empirical data later in this paper. 
4. Net operator approval of exciters, AVR and turbine speed control governors 
Since BC Hydro owns the grid and is responsible for customers serviced by the ISP the independent 
power supplier must have approval to engage in black start and/or ride trough.  
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5. Grid and off grid settings for 25kV line power quality and overcurrent protection 
As discussed earlier in the Protection Coordination sub-chapter a revamp of protection settings and 
functions is needed for any DG operation.  
6. Synchronized capability at feeder breaker substation 
This is imperative to be able to reconnect to the main grid. It is also important if the IPS is to be used 
as a black-start aid for a generator without black-start capabilities.  
7. Real-time IPP data telemetry (remote measuring)  
This is intended to provide the control center with real time information. Control can monitor the 
situation for customers in the IPS and evaluate reconnection to the main grid. The telemetry can be 
done via telephone lease copper wire, internet, satellite or other practical means of data transfer. 
8. Commissioning test for island operation 
This is done as per regulating government’s standard. 
 
 
2.5 Reliability Theory 
In its essence, reliability theory is the science of assessing what proportion of time a system can be 
expected to perform its designated task. There are many different ways to do this, and different 
systems are often best analyzed with their own specific approach. Yet, there are common 
denominators. Normally a system is described as a graph. In this graph nodes represent components 
in the system. These components and their relation to each other in this graph are defined according 
to the intended functionality of the system, and by how the different components are dependent on 
each other. There are many ways in which to define such a stochastic model. The 'homogenous 
Markov-model' which is a highly simplified but generally used model is the basis for the modeling 
program PowerFactory that will be presented later and used for analysis of test cases. 
 
Figure 2.3 – Component timeline with two states. S, “in service” and R, “under repair”. 
Component A in the example in figure 2.3 fails at time    after which it is repaired and put back into 
service at   . It fails again at   , is repaired again, etc. The repair durations   =     ,   =     , 
etc. are exaggerated in this example. The repair durations are also called the 'Time to Repair' or 'TTR'. 
The service durations   =  ,   =     , etc. are called the 'life-time', 'Time to Failure' or 'TTF'. 
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Both the TTR and the TTF are stochastic quantities. By gathering failure data about a large group of 
similar components in system, statistical information about the TTR and TTF, such as the mean value 
and the standard deviation, can be calculated. The statistical information is then used to define a 
stochastic model, such as the homogenous Markov model. Components can have any number of 
characteristics defined for them, but in the homogenous Markov two properties are imperative. 
Interruption frequency, defined as  , and interruption duration defined as  . These are both 
normally averaged value over some time, some amount of components or both. This gives us the 
possibility to define two states for a component, “in service” or “under repair” as explained above. 
Using these two parameters we can define a set of equations that define the homogenous Markov 
model: 
- Mean Time To Failure, TTF = 
 
 
 
- Mean Time To Repair, TTR = 
 
 
 
- Availability, P = 
   
       
 
- Unavailability, Q = 
   
       
 
- Annual Expected Repair Duration, AERD =    
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2.6 PowerFactory 
PowerFactory is a power systems analysis software designed by the software developer DIgSILENT.  
It’s intended to model a variety of aspects concerning power systems planning and operation. The 
focus of DIgSILENT seems to be developing informative graphical representations and intuitive 
interfaces for analyzing the power systems. As a proof of this they claim to be the first company ever 
to include a one-line drawing system for developing power system models.   
 
Since DIgSILENT won’t disclose how their algorithms work in detail it has been difficult to produce an 
exact text on how PowerFactory analyses the models that are created in it. The two biggest 
challenges this paper has had to overcome are mainly related to this lack of knowledge of these 
algorithms. Primarily, the problem of knowing what decisions has been done by the program when 
mitigating contingencies. Secondly, get an overview of what parameters data input that is included in 
the analysis based on what contingency mitigation procedure is chosen. These two aspects of 
analyzing in PowerFactory will be discussed in the Test Cases chapter. The first task of this chapter 
shall be to describe the overall reliability assessment algorithm. After this the key steps composing 
this process shall be explained, followed by an explanation of the different settings that has been 
used in this paper and a subchapter giving hints and tips on to perform an analysis in PowerFactory.       
 
2.6.1 General PowerFactory Algorithm Architecture 
Figure 2.4 shows a flowchart outlining the algorithm used in PF. It requires two major inputs. The 
electrical system model consists of the total topology of the grid and the parameters for defining 
each component in that grid. Basically this means any model on which a power flow analysis can be 
performed. Secondly a failure model has to be input. This input consists of the failure statistics 
defined for each component. Normally characteristic is an interruption frequency and an outage 
duration parameter pair, but other varieties also exist. This characteristic is then put into a loop with 
three steps which are presented in the following subchapters.   
 
 
Figure 2.4 – Flow Chart for PowerFactory Reliability Assessment (18) 
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2.6.2 System State Generation 
When a reliability analysis is conducted in PF the program first compiles a contingency list. This list is 
composed of all the components which are susceptible to contingencies as per their failure 
characteristics. Each component contingency is then generated as a system state with its own 
topology. The topology created is coined as contingency topology. Figure 2.5 demonstrates how the 
contingency topology is formed. In this figure the red lightning symbol indicates a fault. The resulting 
contingency topology after sectioning is demonstrated to the right in the figure. One such 
contingency topology is created for every component with a fault characteristic. If common mode or 
“Independent Second Failure” is enabled, even more contingency scenarios and their respective 
contingency topologies will be created.  This is what’s called the “System State Generation” in figure 
2.4, and is the first step of the reliability assessment iteration.  
 
Figure 2.5 – Example of contingency and resulting contingency topology 
 
2.6.3 Failure Effect Analysis (FEA) 
After the contingency list is generated and enumerated the first contingency topology is sent to the 
“Failure Effect Analysis”. This is the most comprehensive step of the assessment algorithm. Put 
simply, the input contingency topology is checked to see of it is within the limits set in the analysis 
options. If it is not, then mitigating measures are performed as defined in the analysis option. The 
analysis option is presented in the next chapter. From this process a series of contingency 
parameters are calculated. These are listed below. 
-   : Duration of an interruption event m. Based on    and the duration of mitigating 
measures like sectionalizing etc. 
-      The weighted average amount of power disconnected at load point i 
-      The weighted average amount of power shed at load point i 
-           The fraction of the load lost in Load Point i for contingency m 
-       The frequency of occurrence of contingency k 
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There are a lot of different options and limits which can be set for the FEA, but in this paper a 
checklist has been made where all the relevant settings has been listed. The different analysis 
options define the analysis. These tables will be included for each case analysis performed on in the 
test grid analysis part of this paper filled out with the analysis options chosen for the respective case.  
2.6.4 Reliability Assessment Options and its Impact on FEA 
Table 2.9 shows an example checklist of the “Reliability Assessment” which is the function in 
PowerFactory that performs a reliability analysis. What is seen in table 2.9 is the most important 
settings that define the analysis.   
Method Connectivity Analysis  
Load Flow Analysis x 
Network Distribution  
Transmission x 
Contingency Definition Lines/Cables x 
Transformers x 
Common Mode  
Independent Second Failures  
Protection Failure  
Fault Clearance Breakers Use All Circuit Breakers  
Use Switches With Protection 
Devices Only 
x 
Switching Procedure Concurrently  
Sequential x 
Consider Sectionalizing  
Time to open switches manually 60 min  
Voltage limits 0.95 p.u. < u < 1.05 p.u.  
Thermal Constraints Maximum thermal loading 100% 
Islanding Capability Black Start  
Ride Through x 
Table 2.9 – Reliability Assessment Checklist Example 
 
Connectivity Analysis 
This option enables failure effect analysis without considering thermal and voltage constraints. A 
load is assumed to be supplied if it is connected to a source of power. After a contingency the load is 
assumed to undergo a loss of supply if the fault or the process of fault clearance separates the load 
from all power sources. Because constraints are not considered, no load-flow is required for this 
option and hence the analysis will be faster and more robust than when using the alternative load 
flow analysis option. This option will not be utilized much in this paper, but is important when 
building a grid model to get preliminary results before the load flow algorithm converges. 
Load flow analysis 
When this option is selected a load flow check will be performed as defined in the load flow checklist 
presented later in this chapter. Constraints are considered by completing load flows for each 
contingency topology. Loads might be disconnected to alleviate voltage or thermal constraints. For 
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the transmission analysis option, Generator re-dispatch, load transfer and load shedding are used to 
alleviate overloads. These three alleviate options are also explained later in this chapter.   
Distribution 
The reliability assessment will try to remove overloading at components and voltage violations (at 
terminals) by optimizing the switch positions in the radial system. If constraints occur in the power 
restoration process, loads will be shed by opening available switches. This algorithm does not work 
unless the grid structure is radial, and a check to confirm this is done in the beginning of the 
algorithm. 
Transmission 
Thermal overloads are removed by generator re-dispatch, load transfer and load shedding. First 
generators are re-dispatched and load transfer is attempted. If this cannot be completed or does not 
remove the thermal overload, load shedding actions will occur. Generator re-dispatch and load 
transfer do not affect the reliability indices. However, by contrast, load shedding leads to unsupplied 
loads and therefore affects the reliability indices. 
Contingency Definition 
Contingency definition is the list of component types that are to be included in the contingency list. 
The common mode box is checked when you have implemented specific common mode failures and 
you want to add them to the contingency list.  
Secondary independent failures indicate that you want to run an n-2 reliability check with two 
independent failures occurring at the same time with the probability equaling the two separate 
probabilities multiplied with each other.  
Use All Switches as Circuit Breakers 
All switches in the system whose Usage is set to Circuit Breaker can be used for fault clearance. As 
Circuit Breaker is the default usage of all switches, this normally gives you a grid which is cleared for 
faults very fast. Since this paper is mostly working with radials which employ more disconnectors 
than circuit breakers this option is not used much in this paper. But it is used during “calibration” of 
the models. The stage where you check if the protection equipment is behaving as it is intended to. 
Use Only Circuit Breakers with Protection Device 
With this option all circuit breakers in the system that are controlled by a protection device (i.e. fuse 
or relay) can be used for fault clearance. This is the mode normally used in the case analysis. 
 
Concurrent Switching 
It is assumed that the switching actions can be performed immediately following the specified 
switching time. However, a switch can be closed for power restoration only after the faulted element 
was disconnected. The analogy for this mode is if there were a large number of operators in the field 
that were able to communicate with each other to coordinate the switching actions as quickly as 
possible. Therefore, this option gives an optimistic assessment of the 'smart power restoration'. 
21 
 
Sequential Switching 
It`s assumed that all switching actions are performed sequential. The analogy for this mode is if there 
is only a single operator responsible for the grid and he is required to complete all switching actions. 
The fault separation and power restoration is therefore slower when using this mode compared with 
the 'concurrent' mode. 
Protection/Switch Failures 
PowerFactory can consider the failure of the protection system to clear the fault as a stochastic 
probability within the reliability calculation. This is enabled by entering a 'Probability of Failure' into 
the switch object. 'Fault Clearance: circuit breaker fails to open probability' in percent. For example, 
a 5 % failure rate means that on average 1 out of 20 attempted fault clearance operations will fail. 
This again means that the whole circuit breaker zone outside the circuit breaker that is failing will be 
affected and has to be sectionalized off. Also note that this failure characteristic is different than 
what’s normally used in PowerFactory, namely the outage frequency coupled with outage duration.  
 
2.6.5 Load Flow Options 
The load flow analysis options in PF are somewhat extensive. Only the most relevant settings are 
included here. In table 2.10 below an example checklist is presented.   
Calculation Method AC Load Flow. Balanced Positive Sequence x 
DC Load Flow (linear)  
Reactive Power Control Automatic Tap Adjustment of Transformers  
Automatic Shunt Adjustment  
Consider Reactive Power Limits x 
Active Power Control As dispatched.  x 
According to Primary/Secondary Control  
According to inertias  
Considering Active Power Limits x 
Balancing of Production/Load By Reference Machine x 
By Slack Bus  
Distributed Slack by Loads  
Distributed Slack by Generation (Synch. Generators)  
Load Options Voltage dependencies checked at nearest bus  
Table 2.10 – Load Flow Checklist Example 
Generally load flow analysis will be used in this paper as it is necessary to check whether or not 
thermal limits and voltage limits are upheld. Connectivity analysis is mostly used for the construction 
part of the modeling process when it can be difficult to get the load flow calculation algorithms to 
converge. If the load flow analysis option is checked, you need to define your load flow analysis. As 
seen in table 2.10, both AC load flows and DC load flows are viable for the calculation method. The 
rest of the options are explained below. 
Reactive Power Control   
The reactive power control is one way for the PF load flow algorithm to directly mitigate busses 
which have voltages outside the voltage limit set by the operator. It also gives the algorithm the 
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ability to control the amount of reactive power exported/imported from/to other parts of the grid. 
This can be done by either adjusting tap settings in transformers and/or adjusting shunt tap settings. 
The increase/decrease in reactive power flow through the lines will be adjusted by tapping either the 
transformer or the shunt within its predefined limits. These adjustments will be aimed at mitigating 
over/under voltages at the problem busses. 
Active Power Control 
Besides the traditional approach of using a slack generator to establish the power balance within the 
system, PowerFactorys’ load flow calculation tool provides other active power balancing mechanisms 
which more closely represent the reality of transmission networks. These mechanisms are 
implemented in the steady-state according to the control processes that follow the loss of large 
power stations. 
As dispatched: 
Ticking this option indicates that you will define the dispatch that the different generators will output 
when the analysis initializes the grid power flow calculation. The active power dispatched does not 
have to be an exact match of what is consumed by the lines and the loads in the grid, but the 
numbers don’t match a balancing measure will be engaged. Balancing options are explained later in 
this chapter. 
 According to primary control, secondary control or inertias: 
These options are designed to give you a dispatch control which is often used in real life power 
plants. In this paper they are not used much in a direct form, but they are sometimes used in the less 
robust test nets where relieving the reference machine or slack buss is desirable. It can also be used 
explore a somewhat realistic frequency response to a fault, given that the modeling of the 
synchronous machines is detailed enough. 
 
Figure 2.6 - Example of inertia, secondary and primary control 
The Secondary Control option will take into account the participation factors of the machines defined 
within a Power-Frequency Controller in order to compensate for the frequency deviation. The final 
steady state frequency is considered to be the nominal value when active power balancing is needed. 
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This is demonstrated as number 1 in figure 2.6. The Primary Control option will take into account the 
frequency droop (MW/Hz). This needs to be defined for every machine in order to determine the 
active power contribution. Depending on the power unbalance, the steady state frequency will 
deviate from the nominal value. This is indicated as number two in figure 2.6. The According to 
Inertias option will take into account the inertia of each machine. This needs to be defined for every 
machine in order to determine its active power contribution. In this case, depending on the power 
unbalance, the steady state frequency will deviate from the nominal value. This is shown as number 
3 in figure 2.6. 
Consider Active Power Limits 
This option is mostly used when tuning a model for load flow algorithm for iteration converging. This 
basically allows generators to be dispatched outside their active power limit when balancing or 
dispatching. 
 
Balancing of Production/Load 
The Balancing part of the load flow checklist could easily be confused with the Active Power Control. 
The difference is not crystal clear either as both options can behave a bit differently depending on 
what the other options are ticked off for the analysis. The rule of thumb, however, is that active 
power control is mainly used to initialize a grid and set preferences for dynamic analysis of the 
model. The balancing settings have first priority when it comes to balance the general power flow. 
This means that unless commented otherwise in the case, what is defined in the balancing settings 
will control the power flow during both load flow analysis and the general reliability analysis.  
By Reference Machine 
If the balancing is set to this option a calculation will be done to see how much active power is lost in 
the lines, cables, transformers and loads. Then this load will be checked against the dispatch from 
external grid and generators modeled in the grid to see how much surplus/deficit of active power 
there is. The generator set to be reference machine will then be re-dispatched to make up for this 
difference. 
 By Slack Bus 
This option works identically to the reference machine option, except now the external grid is 
supplying the difference in active power. The only real difference is that the external grid can be 
treated as an infinite bus, while generators have capacity limits. 
Distributed Slack by Load 
Under this setting, the active power of the selected group of loads will be modified so that the power 
balance is met while leaving the scheduled active power of each generator unchanged. In this paper 
only load priority will be used to define which loads are to receive a reduction in demand. If this is 
used in a case, the case will specify which loads are to be reduced and what kind of schedule they are 
under. 
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Distributed Slack by Synchronous Generators 
This balancing considers the participation of all synchronous generators according to their scheduled 
active power. If this option is utilized a schedule will be defined in the case text. 
Load dependencies are checked at nearby bus: 
This option is checked when a bus’ voltage dependencies are not considered by the analysis itself. 
The busses are by default what is voltage sensitive in the analysis. This means that if a load can’t have 
a difference in voltage of more than 10% then the bus will be set to a 10% voltage limit, but not the 
load itself. This has little practical implications for the analysis, but should be clarified for 
documentation. 
  
2.6.6 Statistical Evaluation of Indices 
In this part the statistical evaluation step of the general reliability assessment algorithm in 
PowerFactory will be explained. The PowerFactory reliability indices are based on the Markov model 
outlined in the Reliability Theory chapter, but with indices defined by DIgSILENT.  
The units used for the different quantities are defined as follows: 
- Frequencies are expressed in [1/a] = 'per annum' = per year 
- Lifetimes are expressed in [a] = 'annum' 
- Repair times are expressed in [h] = 'hours' 
- Probabilities or expectancies are expressed as a fraction or as time per year, [h/a] or [min/a]. 
This means out interruption frequency,   is a quantity with the unit [1/a] and our expected outage 
duration,   is a quantity in [h]. From this basic Markov model we can now begin to define the 
analysis indices. How these are calculated in practice will be elaborated on in the PowerFactory 
chapter, and is different reliability analysis practices does this in different ways. Mathematically, the 
reliability indices used in this paper are defined using the following added characteristics. 
-   : The number of customers supplied by load point i 
-   : The affected number of customers for an interruption at load point i 
-   : The frequency of interruption in component k 
- C: Total number of customers in grid 
-   : Total connected load interrupted for each interruption event m 
-   : Duration of interruption to component k 
In PowerFactory as in most power system reliability analysis regimes, the focus of the analysis is to 
see how well the load points on average are supplied with electricity. The first indices that have to be 
calculated are therefore the load point indices. In the general PowerFactory reliability assessment 
algorithm architecture the load point list will therefore be the  
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Load Point Indices 
These are the load point indices as defined in the PowerFactory manual (18). 
- ACIF Average Customer Interruption Frequency  
o       ∑               
 
 
  
- ACIT Average Customer Interruption Time 
o       ∑                  
 
 
   
- LPIF Load Point Interruption Frequency 
o                 
 
 
   
- LPIT Load Point Interruption Time  
o                
 
 
  
- AID Average Interruption Duration 
o      
     
     
    
In these equations k is the contingency index and          is the fraction of the load which is lost at 
load point i, for contingency k. For unsupplied loads, or for loads that are shed 
completely,           . For loads that are partially shed,             . Once all this is 
calculated, the system load indices can be calculated. 
 
Load Point Energy Indices 
Perhaps the most crucial of these most crucial of the load point indices are the energy indices.  
- LPENS Load Point Energy Not Supplied 
o              (       ) 
   
 
  
- LPES Load Point Energy Shed 
o                 
   
 
  
In these equations: 
-     is the weighted average amount of power disconnected at load point i 
-     is the weighted average amount of power shed at load point i 
From these the System Energy Indices can be defined, which are the most utilized and discussed in 
this paper. 
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System Energy Indices 
- ENS Energy Not Supplied 
o The most important index for this paper. The total amount on average not delivered 
to the system over the one year analysis period. 
o     ∑         
   
 
  
- SES System Energy Shed 
o Total amount of energy on average expected to be shed in the system. 
o     ∑       [
   
 
]  
- AENS Average Energy Not Supplied 
o The average amount of energy every customer can expect on average not to be 
supplied. 
o      
   
∑    
 
   
 
  
System Load Indices 
There are many indexes defined in the PowerFactory manual, but only the relevant will be defined 
and mentioned here. This does not necessary mean that the specific index is debated in the 
discussion, but is included in the output and/or used to calculate other indices which are relevant. 
- SAIFI System Average Interruption Frequency Index 
o Indicates how often the average customer experiences a sustained interruption 
during the period specified in the calculation.  
o       
∑          
∑    
 
 
  
  
- CAIFI Customer Average Interruption Frequency Index 
o The mean frequency of sustained interruptions for those customers experiencing 
sustained interruptions. Each customer is counted once regardless of the number of 
times interrupted for this calculation.  
o       
∑          
∑    
 
 
 
  
- SAIDI System Average Interruption Duration Index  
o Indicates the total duration of interruption for the average customer during the 
period in the calculation. 
o        
∑          
∑    
 
 
  
  
- CAIDI Customer Average Interruption Duration Index 
o The mean duration required to restore energy supply to a customer. 
o      
     
     
     
- ASIDI Average System Interruption Duration Index 
o This is the equivalent of SAIDI but based on load, rather than customers affected. 
o        
∑ (     ) 
  
 
 
 
  
o In this equation    is the total load. 
- ASUI Average Service Unavailability Index 
o The probability of having all loads supplied. 
o      
∑          
     ∑    
 
 
 
  
General System Index Calculation Algorithm 
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The general algorithm for these calculations is shown in the flowchart in figure 2.7. Note that this 
flowchart is not entirely consistent with the general architecture shown in figure 2.4 in the 
subchapter about general architecture. In the general architecture flowchart a list of contingency 
parameters is not created, but calculated in the outer loop of the general architecture flowchart. 
However, the resulting calculations will be the same. The flowchart in figure 2.7 was created to give a 
better overview of the index calculation process. 
 
Figure 2.7 - Index Calculation Algorithm Flowchart  
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2.6.7 Practical Hints and Tips for PowerFactory 
During the period I have used to learn PowerFactory, it has been cumbersome not to have people 
with actual experience with reliability analysis in PowerFactory to speak to. In the beginning this was 
mostly due to lack of information in the manual and frequent mails were exchanged between the 
support and me. Later on, however, the chapters explaining reliability analysis in the PowerFactory 
manual have become much more detailed. There are still two main questions that remain 
unanswered by DIgSILENT. 
- Lack of Information on Mitigating Measures Procedure 
This has been mentioned earlier in this chapter and is the main uncertainty I have had with 
PowerFactory. The selection of mitigating measures when several not entirely comparable options 
are available. For example, if there is the possibility of either re-dispatching a generator or open a 
backup cable, which option is prioritized? If a meshed island with insufficient production capacity can 
be created for a period while a critical line is being repaired, how is the production/load shedding 
performed? The answer to the first question, according to the manual, is that an evaluation of all the 
mitigating measures available are performed and judged by an objective function (minimize cost, 
minimize loss, minimize ENS etc.). The answer to the second question is that loads are prioritized 
according to priority or predefined costs for shedding the load. However, in practice it is often 
difficult to see how or if PowerFactory is actually performing these measures as the results can be 
very contradictory. The “Optimal Power Flow” function which analyzes the objective functions in 
both these cases is notoriously unstable, and no error message is given if it does not converge during 
reliability assessment. I consider this important to be aware off when analyzing reliability in 
PowerFactory. And of course, ideally, DIgSILENT should document this better in the manual for the 
future. 
- Adding Failure Effects on Protection Equipment  
Adding a failure effect to a protection device in itself is not very complicated (in the 
reliability section of that “type” or that “component”). The effect on for example a 
single line supplying a faultless load and bus bar system like in figure 2.8 should be 
easy to predict. Let the two red circles indicate circuit breaker and the upper line have 
an interruption frequency of 5 [1/a]. The upper circuit breaker has a fault chance of 
5%. In this situation 5%*5 [1/a]=0.25 [1/a] should give the amount of times the system 
would have to sectionalize all the way down to the second circuit breaker. However, in 
practice this works only some of the time and I have even experienced decreased ENS 
as a result of introducing failure effects. This problem can be experienced in even very 
simple systems with complete control over all disconnectors and circuit breakers. 
Hints and Tips 
- My best tip for performing reliability analysis in PowerFactory is to get the 
basic power system model right and with sensible load flow results. An unstable net which is 
not well within its voltage boundaries and thermal boundaries is much harder to analyze 
correctly in a load flow check in a reliability analysis. If you are not experienced in this 
yourself, get help from people with experience in load flow analysis if possible. The more 
reliable and stable your net is, the easier it is to get predictable and plausible results.  
Figure 2.8 - Circuit 
Breaker Failure Example 
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- The reliability analysis also gets exponentially more difficult to manage the more complexity 
you add to the model. This might seem obvious, but is very helpful to keep in mind. Take a 
step by step approach to building your net and checking of the numbers seem legitimate for 
every step. Figure 2.9 below is an example suggested in the PowerFactory manual.  I suggest 
leaving out maintenance plans and load characteristics until everything else works, as 
checking if your results are reasonable becomes more difficult including these settings. 
- Lastly, this might be obvious to some as well, but it took me some time to find this out on my 
own. When you edit switches, the reliability section includes a section called “power 
restoration”. The option remote controlled is best used when you want the switch to work as 
a circuit breaker (You still need to add a relay to the switch, as described in the manual. Any 
relay type will do, but I normally used overcurrent.) Setting the switch to manual gives it 
disconnector-like properties (you can set sectioning times etc.).    
 
 
Figure 2.9 - DIgSILENT Reliability Assesment Suggestion 
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3. Test Net Analysis 
This section is quite long and tedious. As it’s not possible to verify these results with a 100% certainty 
it’s been included discussions and estimates to substantiate the results of the analysis. The chapter is 
structured with subchapters, each including a grid to be analyzed. The grid is in introduced with 
component data, structure and a few notes. Then test cases and analysis follows for each grid with a 
small summary at the end for each grid. The summary will only include ENS differences and SAIFI 
(System Average Interruption Frequency Index) differences. Changes in interruption frequencies and 
load point indices could also be included and elaborated on when substantiating the results, but the 
analysis already seemed extensive enough. There are possibilities for including different cost vectors 
which could have calculated the KILE costs as according to Forskrift om økonomisk teknisk 
rapportering (6), but there were problems with implementing these. However, a rough cost estimate 
will be considered good enough for this paper, as the radials are assumed to contain mostly 
households as no other information had been given. Most interruption durations are set to be less 
than 4 hours, which makes the KILE cost easy to calculate using the simplified KILE formulation used 
by NVE.  
3.1 Empirical line A  
The Empirical line A is the most detailed real life radial grid which is analyzed in this paper. The 
reliability data is directly measured in the region and should therefore be very accurate. This also 
imposes a bigger need for anonymity. Figure 3.1 shows the actual grid which was constructed as 
modeled by the grid company. Figure 3.2 shows a simplified version of the grid with external grid 
connection and generators implicated.  
 
Figure 3.1 - Anonymous line A, poor resolution as imposed by confidentiality clause 
Simplifications and assumptions 
A few of the loads have been left out due to lack of information and parts of the net have been 
simplified. The loads left out were assumed not to be included in the line anymore. They are greyed 
out on sketches and are excluded from the excel tables with measurements received from the 
operator. The majority of simplifications consist of leaving out nodes that seemed to be relevant for 
reliability analysis purposes.  
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The significant simplifications are the following. 
- Nodes midways in lines between loads which are assumed to be of importance to operators, but 
who are inconsequential for reliability assessment purposes. 
- Nodes with disconnectors in places where they will have no effect on the reliability simulation 
result. For example a disconnector at the beginning and at the end of a feeder line which instead 
can be isolated at the nearest bus bar connected to a load with no implication for the load point 
failure frequencies or downtime of other loads. These disconnectors are assumed to be present 
in the line for maintenance or other purposes rather than for reliability enhancement.    
 
 
Figure 3.2 - Simplified sketch of line A 
 
Loads, switching and relays 
The loads are spread out with relative homogeneity in size and quantity throughout the line and are 
about the size you could expect from housholds. Each 
load is connected to the distribution grid with a 
distribution transformer. Between these transformers 
and the distribution grid there are disconnectors in 
case a faulted transformer needs to be sectioned off 
the grid together with its load. All nodes with more 
than two distribution lines connected to them are 
connected through disconnectors. These disconnectors 
are tripped manually, and the sectioning time average 
which is operated with in this paper is one hour. The external grid and all DG units are connected 
through circuit breakers. These generators are normally tripped when external grid connection 
trough an anti-islanding protection relay.    
 
 
Total heavy load 3 MW 
Number of loads 100 
Total line length 73km 
Sectioning time 1 hour 
Number of nodes in model 370 
Distribution voltage 22 kV 
Customer voltage 230 V 
Circuit Breaker Failure Rate 1,3% 
Table 3.1 - General grid date for line A 
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Reliability data 
The reliability data is the grid operators own data collected from the area. Because of this, and 
because the general data available from the operator for this grid, the results from assessing 
different scenarios of this grid will 
be the most accurate of all the 
grids. As can be estimated from 
the table 3.2 data, a significant 
proportion of the outage time is 
contributed from the external 
grid. A scenario where the only 
protection system present was a circuit breaker between the distribution grid and the external grid 
would have a contribution to outage time from the lines in the range of                  ⁄  
                 . This represents a maximum. A similar calculation for the external grid 
yields 25.3 MWh/a 
Line and component data 
Since line info was not given from the grid operator it was assumed that a cheap FerAl 50 1/6 was 
used. The cable type in this model is a N2XSEY 12mm. N2XSEY was not the actual type cable used, 
but it was chosen because it 
had plausible impedance 
values and an informative 
data sheet available 
publicly. Transformer 
impedances are set to zero 
due to lack of data. In this specific model the impedances are not vital, as the load flows are well 
within limits even in heavy load combined with low production scenarios, such as the base case 
described below.   
 
1. Base Case 
Line A was originally modeled to control the grid operators own reliability assessment results. This 
modeling scenario consisted of heavy loading coupled with DG units who had anti-islanding 
protection systems.  This implies that any fault in the grid will trip generators until sectioning has 
been performed. If grid connection is restored to the portion of the grid where the DG unit is located, 
the generator attempts to reconnect to the grid. Since there are no available reliability data for 
generators they have no implications for the reliability assessment of this scenario, and can therefore 
be disregarded completely. Another thing worth noting here is that since the loads did not come with 
any reactive power data, reactive power limits are not considered, as can be seen from table 3.4. 
 
 
 
 
 Repair Duration Interruption Frequency 
Transformers 5.35   [h] 0.00105 [1/a] 
External Grid 1.507 [h] 5.604      [1/a] 
Lines 3.55   [h] 0.0041    [1/a*km] 
Cables 7.7     [h] 0.0215    [1/a*km] 
Generators 50      [h] 5              [1/a] 
Table 3.2 - Line A reliability data 
 R’[ohm/km] X’[ohm/km] B’[ohm/km] 
Lines 1.27 0.4 2e-6 
Cables 0.2 0.1 60e-6 
Transformer 0 0 0 
 
 
 
Table 3.3 - Line A component impedance data 
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Calculation Method AC Load Flow. Balanced Positive Sequence x 
DC Load Flow (linear)  
Reactive Power Control Automatic Tap Adjustment of Transformers  
Automatic Shunt Adjustment  
Consider Reactive Power Limits  
Active Power Control As dispatched.  x 
According to Primary/Secondary Control  
According to inertias  
Considering Active Power Limits x 
Balancing of Production/Load By Reference Machine  
By Slack Bus x 
Distributed Slack by Loads  
Distributed Slack by Generation (Synch. Generators)  
Load Options Voltage dependencies checked at nearest bus  
Table 3.4 - Load Flow Calculation settings 
Method Connectivity Analysis  
Load Flow Analysis x 
Network Distribution x 
Transmission  
Contingency Definition Lines/Cables x 
Transformers x 
Common Mode  
Independent Second Failures  
 Protection Failures x 
Fault Clearance Breakers Use All Circuit Breakers x 
Use Switches With Protection 
Devices Only 
 
Switching Procedure Concurrently  
Sequential x 
Consider Sectionalizing  
Time to open switches manually 60 min  
Voltage limits 0.95 p.u. < u < 1.05 p.u.  
Thermal Constraints Maximum thermal loading 100% 
Islanding Capability Black Start  
Ride Through x 
Table 3.5 - Reliability Assessment settings in PF for Base Case Line A 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| System Summary                                                                                                                   
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| System Average Interruption Frequency Index          :  SAIFI  =    6,137403 1/Ca                                                
| Customer Average Interruption Frequency Index        :  CAIFI  =    6,137403 1/Ca                                                
| System Average Interruption Duration Index           :  SAIDI  =    9,910    h/Ca                                                
| Customer Average Interruption Duration Index         :  CAIDI  =    1,615    h                                                   
| Average Service Availability Index                   :  ASAI   =    0,9990050744                                                 
| Average Service Unavailability Index                 :  ASUI   =    0,0009949256                                                 
| Energy Not Supplied                                  :  ENS    =   29,315    MWh/a                                               
| Average Energy Not Supplied                          :  AENS   =    0,262    MWh/Ca                                              
| Average Customer Curtailment Index                   :  ACCI   =    0,259    MWh/Ca                                              
| Expected Interruption Cost                           :  EIC    =    0,000    M$/a                                                
| Interrupted Energy Assessment Rate                   :  IEAR   =    0,000    $/kWh                                               
| System energy shed                                   :  SES    =    0,000    MWh/a                                               
| Average System Interruption Frequency Index          :  ASIFI  =    6,028698 1/a                                                 
| Average System Interruption Duration Index           :  ASIDI  =    9,732747 h/a                                                 
| Momentary Average Interruption Frequency Index       :  MAIFI  =    0,000000 1/Ca                                                
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 3.6 – Case 1 Reliability Assessment Results 
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From table 3.5 we see that a distribution analysis was done. This is only for practical reasons as the 
level of detail of the model makes a complete load flow time consuming. The external connection 
point is chosen as the slack bus for balancing. 
Table 3.6 shows us an ENS of 29.315MWh/a. Compared to the 13 MWh/a ENS (19) which is 
demonstrated in the reference simulation from the net operator this result is more than the double 
of what the result should be. This is because variable load was not implemented, and the senior 
engineer responsible for line A commented that 29.3MWh/a was very plausible number for a 
constant heavy load scenario. Since this example in principle is relatively simple we can get an 
estimate of the plausibility of this ENS result. There are only a few kilometers of cable compared to 
lines, and they have roughly the same expected downtime we include the cables as lines in this 
estimate calculation.   
     0.0041[interruptions/a*km]*73[km]*1[h]*3[MW] 
     0.00105[interruptions/a]*100*1[h]*3[MW] 
+ 1.507[interrupts/a]*5.6[h]*3[MW] 
= 26.53 [MWh/a] 
 
The first line in this calculation is the sum of all the interrupts caused by lines and cables multiplied 
by the sectioning time and complete heavy load. The second line multiplies the average interruption 
frequency of the distribution transformers by the number of transformers in line A. The last line in 
the estimate calculation is the average number of hours the external grid is disconnected or de-
energized throughout a year multiplied by the total load in the grid. This estimates the lowest 
threshold of ENS in a system with the Base Case protection and modeling setup.  
 
2. Original Generators with Islanding Capability, Heavy Load 
According to the BC Hydro heuristics explained in the BC Hydro chapters, a 6MW of producing 
maximum capacity is needed in the grid to sustain a grid with 3MW heavy load. As can be seen from 
table 3.7 this is not the case for line A with a generator maximum production of 2.975 MW.  This case 
will see how much these two generators can alleviate the total ENS on their own without considering 
the framework conditions that needs to be fulfilled for this system to be allowed under Norwegian 
law.  
 
 Max 
Capacity 
Type Rated 
Voltage 
Role Dispatched 
Power 
PF 
Gen 1 2 MVA Synch. Gen. 22 kV Swing Machine 0 MW 0.85 
Gen 2 1.5 MVA Synch. Gen. 22 kV  1.275 MW 0.85 
Gen 3 3 MVA Synch. Gen. 22 kV Not yet implemented - 0.85 
Table 3.7 - Generator data for Original Generators Heavy Load Case 
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Calculation Method AC Load Flow. Balanced Positive Sequence x 
DC Load Flow (linear)  
Reactive Power Control Automatic Tap Adjustment of Transformers  
Automatic Shunt Adjustment  
Consider Reactive Power Limits  
Active Power Control As dispatched.  x 
According to Primary/Secondary Control  
According to inertias  
Considering Active Power Limits x 
Balancing of Production/Load By Reference Machine x 
By Slack Bus  
Distributed Slack by Loads  
Distributed Slack by Generation (Synch. Generators)  
Load Options Voltage dependencies checked at nearest bus  
Table 3.8 - Load Flow Settings for Original Generators Heavy Load Case 
 
As we can see from table 3.9 a ride through mechanism has been applied to the islanding system. 
This means we will not have to calculate for black starts in our outage durations. The transmission 
analysis method has been checked to perform load shedding according to priority and balancing of 
the reference machine.  When the analysis is performed according to table 3.9 setup, the results are 
as presented in table 3.10 on the next page. 
 
Method Connectivity Analysis  
Load Flow Analysis x 
Network Distribution  
Transmission x 
Contingency Definition Lines/Cables x 
Transformers x 
Common Mode  
Independent Second Failures  
Protection Failures  
Fault Clearance Breakers Use All Circuit Breakers  
Use Switches With Protection 
Devices Only 
x 
Switching Procedure Concurrently  
Sequential x 
Consider Sectionalizing  
Time to open switches manually 60 min  
Voltage limits 0.95 p.u. < u < 1.05 p.u.  
Thermal Constraints Maximum thermal loading 100% 
Islanding Capability Black Start  
Ride Through x 
Table 3.9 - Reliability Assessment analysis setup for Heavy Load Islanding Case 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| System Summary                                                                                                                   
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| System Average Interruption Frequency Index          :  SAIFI  =    0,516622 1/Ca                                                
| Customer Average Interruption Frequency Index        :  CAIFI  =    0,516622 1/Ca                                                
| System Average Interruption Duration Index           :  SAIDI  =    0,863    h/Ca                                                
| Customer Average Interruption Duration Index         :  CAIDI  =    1,670    h                                                   
| Average Service Availability Index                   :  ASAI   =    0,9999015149                                                 
| Average Service Unavailability Index                 :  ASUI   =    0,0000984851                                                 
| Energy Not Supplied                                  :  ENS    =    2,540    MWh/a                                               
| Average Energy Not Supplied                          :  AENS   =    0,025    MWh/Ca                                              
| Average Customer Curtailment Index                   :  ACCI   =    0,049    MWh/Ca                                              
| Expected Interruption Cost                           :  EIC    =    0,000    M$/a                                                
| Interrupted Energy Assessment Rate                   :  IEAR   =    0,000    $/kWh                                               
| System energy shed                                   :  SES    =    0,000    MWh/a                                               
| Average System Interruption Frequency Index          :  ASIFI  =    0,502963 1/a                                                 
| Average System Interruption Duration Index           :  ASIDI  =    0,843188 h/a                                                 
| Momentary Average Interruption Frequency Index       :  MAIFI  =    0,000000 1/Ca                                                
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 3.10 – Case 2 Reliability Assessment Results 
The reliability assessment outputs an ENS of 2.54 MWh/a. If we consider the Base Case modeling 
result from table 3.10 and subtract the contribution from the external grid (averaging 25.4 MWh/a) 
we get an estimate on the lowest ENS for this scenario, given that the radial was supplied from the 
external grid with no reference machine inside the grid. 
      
   
 
       
   
 
     
   
 
 
Curiously, this number is higher than the modeling results from 3.10 indicate (2.54 MWh). However, 
by changing the balancing settings so that the reference machine (Gen 1) is used to dispatch the slack 
we have a change in topology. For example, if the cable connecting the external grid to Line A was 
faulted and had to be repaired, Gen 1 would still provide power to most of the line after sectioning 
has been done. All the different contingency scenarios where repairing the line between Gen 1 and 
the external grid would normally cause a big portion of loads to become de-energized, are now 
mostly supplied by Gen 1. This difference probably amounts to the general reduction in ENS shown 
by the simulation. If only considering ENS this is a good result, but it is worth noting that a setup 
which allows for flexible group of load points to be islanded might require a far more sophisticated 
protection system setup.  
Minimum Required Upgrades for this scenario: 
- Refitting circuit breakers with proper two way relay system 
- Sufficient AVR and frequency regulating mechanism for Generators 
- Synchronization equipment for reconnecting to external grid 
- Engineered mass for generators 
- Telematics and independently supplied communication equipment for contacting net operator 
 
3. Only Original Generators and Reduced Sectioning Radius Case 
This scenario is a more realistic approach to how the existing power producing capabilities can be 
used to supply an islanding system. The heuristics from Bolton Bar states that maximum production 
capacity of DG units should be double that of heavy load for islanding to become feasible. Available 
information from Line A is not very specific about specifications for Gen 1 and Gen 2, but capacity 
and type of generator is supplied. They are 2MVA and 1.5MVA respectively. If we place a circuit 
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breaker in the spot marked as “Circuit Breaker 4” in figure 3.3, we have defined an island of about 
1.7 MW. This is roughly half the 3.5 MVA at 0.85 pf (3MW) the original DG units in line A can output.  
 
Figure 3.3 - Line A case 3 circuit breaker placement 
The same load flow and reliability assessment settings can be used as in case 2, as shown in table 
3.11 and table 3.12 on the next page. Normally the PF algorithm is set to load shedding, but since we 
in this case always have either enough power production or no power at all in any part of the grid at 
any contingency this is not strictly necessary.  Placing Circuit Breaker 4 could have been done more 
optimal if we are very keen on upholding the Boston Bar heuristics, but that would have come at the 
cost of a bigger ENS and more circuit breakers would have to be installed. This would also increase 
the complexity of the system, which again would have made protection coordination even more 
difficult. 
 
Calculation Method AC Load Flow. Balanced Positive Sequence x 
DC Load Flow (linear)  
Reactive Power Control Automatic Tap Adjustment of Transformers  
Automatic Shunt Adjustment  
Consider Reactive Power Limits  
Active Power Control As dispatched.  x 
According to Primary/Secondary Control  
According to inertias  
Considering Active Power Limits x 
Balancing of Production/Load By Reference Machine x 
By Slack Bus  
Distributed Slack by Loads  
Distributed Slack by Generation (Synch. Generators)  
Load Options Voltage dependencies checked at nearest bus  
Table 3.11 - Case 3 Load Flow Settings 
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Method Connectivity Analysis  
Load Flow Analysis x 
Network Distribution  
Transmission x 
Contingency Definition Lines/Cables x 
Transformers x 
Common Mode  
Independent Second Failures  
Protection Failures  
Fault Clearance Breakers Use All Circuit Breakers  
Use Switches With Protection 
Devices Only 
x 
Switching Procedure Concurrently  
Sequential x 
Consider Sectionalizing  
Time to open switches manually 60 min  
Voltage limits 0.95 p.u. < u < 1.05 p.u.  
Thermal Constraints Maximum thermal loading 100% 
Islanding Capability Black Start  
Ride Through x 
Table 3.12 - Case 3 Reliability Analysis Settings 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| System Summary                                                                                                                   
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| System Average Interruption Frequency Index          :  SAIFI  =    0,438978 1/Ca                                                
| Customer Average Interruption Frequency Index        :  CAIFI  =    0,438978 1/Ca                                                
| System Average Interruption Duration Index           :  SAIDI  =    0,754    h/Ca                                                
| Customer Average Interruption Duration Index         :  CAIDI  =    1,718    h                                                   
| Average Service Availability Index                   :  ASAI   =    0,9999139239                                                 
| Average Service Unavailability Index                 :  ASUI   =    0,0000860761                                                 
| Energy Not Supplied                                  :  ENS    =    2,228    MWh/a                                               
| Average Energy Not Supplied                          :  AENS   =    0,022    MWh/Ca                                              
| Average Customer Curtailment Index                   :  ACCI   =    0,052    MWh/Ca                                              
| Expected Interruption Cost                           :  EIC    =    0,000    M$/a                                                
| Interrupted Energy Assessment Rate                   :  IEAR   =    0,000    $/kWh                                               
| System energy shed                                   :  SES    =    0,000    MWh/a                                               
| Average System Interruption Frequency Index          :  ASIFI  =    0,429121 1/a                                                 
| Average System Interruption Duration Index           :  ASIDI  =    0,739663 h/a                                                 
| Momentary Average Interruption Frequency Index       :  MAIFI  =    0,000000 1/Ca                                                
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 3.13 - Reliability assessment results for case 3 
 
When we run the analysis we get the results shown in table 3.13. We can see a slight reduction in the 
ENS from 2.54 MWh to 2.228MWh. Since we now have a smaller islanding scheme in terms of load, 
this might seem curios. The reason is that in this scenario we are forced to invest in a fourth circuit 
breaker, which makes sectionalizing out faults in the outer parts of the grid demand less time. The 
drawback is, that we have to invest in another circuit breaker.   
Minimum Required Upgrades for this scenario: 
- New circuit breaker with proper two way relay system 
- Sufficient AVR and frequency regulating mechanism for Generators 
- Synchronization equipment for reconnecting to external grid 
- Engineered mass for generators 
-  Telematics and independently supplied communication equipment for contacting net operator 
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4. Black starting after external grid fallout case 
 With the level of PowerFactory competence and programming experience the author of this paper 
currently has, a black start case can’t be modeled directly in PowerFactory with default power 
control settings. However, looking at what will happen in the grid we see that it is possible to divide it 
into two separate scenarios which can be added together. For simplicity, the islanding zone will have 
to be the whole radial starting from the circuit breaker dividing the external grid from line A.  By 
removing the contingency situation caused by external grid fallout, all we have left is the internal 
fault handling. This fault handling is independent of the black start capability anyway, as a fault 
within the primary circuit breaker will cause a sectionalizing procedure to be engaged regardless. 
This   sectionalizing procedure takes 60 minutes compared to the black start duration which is 10 
minutes. Thus, removing the external grid contingency and setting the reliability analysis to table 
2.16 we get the results shown 
in table 2.15, which are also 
the same as in case 2. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| System Summary                                                                                                                   
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| System Average Interruption Frequency Index          :  SAIFI  =    0,516622 1/Ca                                                
| Customer Average Interruption Frequency Index        :  CAIFI  =    0,516622 1/Ca                                                
| System Average Interruption Duration Index           :  SAIDI  =    0,863    h/Ca                                                
| Customer Average Interruption Duration Index         :  CAIDI  =    1,670    h                                                   
| Average Service Availability Index                   :  ASAI   =    0,9999015149                                                 
| Average Service Unavailability Index                 :  ASUI   =    0,0000984851                                                 
| Energy Not Supplied                                  :  ENS    =    2,540    MWh/a                                               
| Average Energy Not Supplied                          :  AENS   =    0,025    MWh/Ca                                              
| Average Customer Curtailment Index                   :  ACCI   =    0,049    MWh/Ca                                              
| Expected Interruption Cost                           :  EIC    =    0,000    M$/a                                                
| Interrupted Energy Assessment Rate                   :  IEAR   =    0,000    $/kWh                                               
| System energy shed                                   :  SES    =    0,000    MWh/a                                               
| Average System Interruption Frequency Index          :  ASIFI  =    0,502963 1/a                                                 
| Average System Interruption Duration Index           :  ASIDI  =    0,843188 h/a                                                 
| Momentary Average Interruption Frequency Index       :  MAIFI  =    0,000000 1/Ca                                                
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 3.15 - Case 4 Reliability Assessment Results (no external grid fallout) 
  
By multiplying the 8.4452 [h/a] average outage duration of the external grid with the 10 [minutes] 
and the total load of 3 [MW] we get the contribution to ENS shown in table 3.15. Adding the external 
grid/black start contribution to the inherent ENS in the grid topology contribution of 2.54 MWh we 
get 6.7626 MWh. Depending on what proportion of time is spent by operators evaluating the black 
start, and how long the black start requires mechanically, these numbers should be realistic. 
It is assumed, for example, that the black start duration of ten minutes is mostly operators verifying 
the go ahead. If not the ten minutes would have to be added to sectioning time, and only added 
when the main grid is down. This would make it a much more complex operation in PF. No specific 
numbers are given in Boston Bar report on the black start timings. 
 
 
Time from tripped external grid to black start 10 [min] 
External grid contribution to ENS 4.22 [MWh/a] 
Table 3.14 - Additional information concerning black start emulation 
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Method Connectivity Analysis  
Load Flow Analysis x 
Network Distribution  
Transmission x 
Contingency Definition Lines/Cables x 
Transformers x 
Common Mode  
Independent Second Failures  
Fault Clearance Breakers Use All Circuit Breakers  
Use Switches With Protection 
Devices Only 
x 
Switching Procedure Concurrently  
Sequential x 
Consider Sectionalizing  
Time to open switches manually 60 min  
Voltage limits 0.95 p.u. < u < 1.05 p.u.  
Thermal Constraints Maximum thermal loading 100% 
Islanding Capability Black Start x 
Ride Through  
Table 3.16 - Case 4 Reliability Assessment Settings 
Calculation Method AC Load Flow. Balanced Positive Sequence x 
DC Load Flow (linear)  
Reactive Power Control Automatic Tap Adjustment of Transformers  
Automatic Shunt Adjustment  
Consider Reactive Power Limits  
Active Power Control As dispatched.  x 
According to Primary/Secondary Control  
According to inertias  
Considering Active Power Limits x 
Balancing of Production/Load By Reference Machine x 
By Slack Bus  
Distributed Slack by Loads  
Distributed Slack by Generation (Synch. Generators)  
Load Options Voltage dependencies checked at nearest bus  
Table 3.17 - Case 4 Load Flow Settings 
Minimum Required Upgrades for this scenario: 
- Refitting circuit breakers with proper two way relay system 
- Sufficient AVR and frequency regulation mechanisms for generators 
- Synchronization equipment for reconnecting to external grid 
- Engineered mass for generators 
- Telematics and independently supplied communication equipment for contacting net operator 
- Extra aggregate to black start power island 
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5. Protection and Generator Failure 
To calculate the minimum and estimate a good average contribution from a failure rate in the 
protection mechanism for the generating units in Line A we need to estimate a circuit breaker failure 
rate and a generator failure rate. The circuit breaker estimate needs to be in a format of “percentage 
chance of not tripping when failure occurs”. This is not how failure in circuit breakers is logged in 
Nordic countries. The paper The Reliability of Breaker Failure Scheme for Transmission line Feeders 
(20) describes a circuit breaker failure rate of 1.3% as an average failure rate for modern circuit 
breakers. Other sources suggest even higher failure rates of up to 5% are common in distribution 
grids. The generator failure characteristics of generators in Nordic countries are not very well 
monitored either. In the paper Reliability Modeling of Distributed Generation in Conventional 
Distribution Systems Planning and Analysis (21) an interruption frequency of 5 [1/a] and an average 
repair time of 50 [h] is used as an estimate, and the same characteristic will be employed here. When 
not employing the Independent Second Failure option in the reliability analysis settings PF defines 
each contingency case as independent of each other. Since simulating a proper failure response to 
circuit breaker failure was not possible, generator failure will assumed to be independent of other 
failures in the grid. This is a reasonable estimate for a distribution grid as even though the average 
outage time for a generator is 250 [h] a year, the generator still has an uptime of 97.15%. Since the 
contingencies are independent, the external grid will be available for all loads in the grid whenever a 
generator circuit breaker failure occurs. This means ENS contribution will be solely the duration of 
sectionalizing off the generator for all loads in the line. This means we can calculate the ENS 
contribution as: 
               [
 
             
]   [
             
            
]                                 
   
 
  
  
This equals about 1.3% of the base case ENS. 
 
3.1.1 Summary of Line A results 
- Case 1:  Base case 
- Case 2: Islanding original generators with heavy load 
o Refitting circuit breakers with proper two way relay system 
o Sufficient AVR and frequency regulating mechanism for Generators 
o Synchronization equipment for reconnecting to external grid 
o Engineered mass for generators 
o Telematics and independently supplied communication equipment for contacting net 
operator 
- Case 3: Original generators islanding with reduced island load due to separation by circuit 
breaker 
o Additional circuit breaker and refitting old circuit breakers with proper two way relay 
system 
o Sufficient AVR and frequency regulating mechanism for Generators 
o Synchronization equipment for reconnecting to external grid 
o Engineered mass for generators 
o Telematics and independently supplied communication equipment for contacting net 
operator 
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- Case 4: Blackstart enabled generators 
o Additional circuit breaker for new generator and refitting old circuit breakers with 
proper two way relay system 
o Sufficient AVR and frequency regulating mechanism for Generators 
o Synchronization equipment for reconnecting to external grid 
o Engineered mass for generators 
o Telematics and independently supplied communication equipment for contacting net 
operator 
- Case 5: Base case with fault characteristics included for circuit breakers  
 
  ENS [MWh/a] 
 ENS in percentage 
of base case 
SAIFI [1/a] 
SAIFI as percentage 
of base case 
Case 1 29,315 - 6,137 - 
Case 2 2,54 8,66 % 0,5166 8,4% 
Case 3 2,228 7,60 % 0,4389 7,15% 
Case 4 6,7626 23,07 % 0,5166 8,4% 
Case 5 29,705 101,33 % - - 
Table 3.18 - ENS and SAIFI summary for Test Net A 
  
KILE 
[NOK/a] 
 KILE as percentage 
of base case 
Accumulated KILE over 20 years 
with 3% discount rate [NOK] 
Savings over 20 years 
from base case [NOK] 
Case 1 31645 - 875 822 - 
Case 2 2741 8,66 % 75 861 800 000 
Case 3 2405 7,60 % 66 562 809 260 
Case 4 7300 23,07 % 20 238 673 784 
Case 5 32066 101,33 % 88 747 -11 651 
Table 3.19 - KILE Summary for Test Net A 
 
As can be seen from the tables Line A responds well to measures to reduce ENS. It’s difficult to 
conclude on whether or not it’s a good investment to invest in ENS reducing measures like a system 
to island generators from this simulation alone Still, if we assume the price of a circuit breaker 
installation to be around 400,000 NOK total, the case 3 approach already seem economically 
farfetched considering all the other equipment that has to be provided. Expenses on labor, training 
and such will also factor in. Case 2 does not entirely fulfill the BC Hydro guidelines for an islanding 
radial system.   
44 
 
3.2 Extended Billington Test Net for Educational Purposes (RBTS) 
The RBTS (22) net was initially introduced to analyze a radial net containing several branches and 
backup cables (seen as dotted lines on top and bottom of the figure 3.4).  The backup cables were 
implemented as faultless since were only be utilized when an error occurs in the feeders. In this 
analysis backup cables will not be utilized as it will add several extra dimensions to the analysis which 
are uncertain. Questions such as the priority of different mitigating measures such as for example 
“open back-up cable” or “re-dispatch generators” would have to be answered. Because of the lack of 
technical information on analysis provided by DIgSILENT these types of questions are difficult to 
answer with certainty.   
Figure 3.4 - RBTS One Line Schematics 
 
Each branch from the main bus 11 kV (F1, F2, F3 and F4) is isolated by a circuit breaker. The first 
thing to note about this case is that the two main transformers connecting the main 11kV bus to the 
grid seem to be in the same circuit breaker zone judging from the drawing shown figure 3.4. This is 
because the bus bar connecting the two transformers to the external grid there is only one circuit 
breaker disconnecting the external grid, but no circuit breakers isolating the two transformers from 
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each other. With this setup a single fault in one of the main transformers would leave the whole grid 
de-energized for three hours a year. This alone would accumulate to a 2x60MWh ENS per year, 
which is far from the reference result shown in the original analysis report (22). In my PF analysis I 
assumed that the main transformers could be separated with circuit breakers on each side so that at 
least one transformer could continue to feed 
the grid while the other was being repaired. 
Comments on Data 
Since this is grid constructed for educational 
purposes the reliability data is either well 
defined or it is non-existent. As with many of 
the grids that are analyzed in this paper 
specific empirical data of external grid reliability is not available. Since preliminary deduction 
indicates that external grid failures seem to be the reliability oriented problem that islanding DG 
units are the most apt at combating, an external grid failure characteristic will be defined for this 
grid.  The failure characteristic that is provided for the regional grid is similar to the one supplied for 
Line A. Since Statnett 
provides numbers 
indicating how often 
a distribution net is 
affected by a failure 
in the regional grid, 
the original external grid failure characteristics will be modified so that it more precisely indicates 
how regional failure affects the distribution grid. This is done by taking the raw numbers on 
interruptions and repair time from Statnett (23) and modifying them using NVEs ratios of 
“interruption in regional grid”/”interruption in distribution grid” (24).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total Active Load in RBTS Radial 20 [MW] 
Total Reactive Load in RBTS Radial 0 [MVAr] 
Total Line Length in RBTS Radial 25.5 [km] 
Number of Load Points 22 
Sectioning Time 60 [min] 
Number of Distribution Transformers 20 
 Repair Duration Interruption Frequency 
Lines 8       [h] 0.04875 [1/km*a] 
Cables - - 
External Grid 0.12 [h] 0.675      [1/a] 
Distribution Transformers 200  [h] 0.015      [1/a] 
Main Transformers 120  [h] 0.015      [1/a] 
Table 3.20 - Component Reliability Data 
Table 3.21 - RBTS Radial Basic Data 
 
 
R’ [ohm/km] X’ [ohm/km] B’ [ohm/km] Capacity 
Line 0.35 0.4 2e-6 - 
Cable - - - - 
Main Transformer 0 0 0 16 MVA 
Distribution Transformer 0 0 0 2 MVA 
Table 3.22 - Component Impedance Data 
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1. Base Case 
The base case chosen for the RBTS radial is a standard load and no DG production. From table 3.23 
we can see that reactive power is not to be considered in this case. In the reference paper on this 
grid reactive power is not a part of the analysis. Thus, data on reactive power is not provided. 
Originally the grid is well inside voltage boundaries and with plenty of capacity to spare. This base 
test will therefor only check the sectionalizing response of the grid during normal fault scenarios. 
Transmission is chosen for mitigating faults. Distribution could have been used for easier analysis, but 
the Distribution type of analysis checks for meshed structures. A mesh is rightly detected in the 
system formed by the two main transformers connecting the 33 kV bus and the 11 kV. There are no 
generators present in the grid for this analysis. 
Calculation Method AC Load Flow. Balanced Positive Sequence x 
DC Load Flow (linear)  
Reactive Power Control Automatic Tap Adjustment of Transformers  
Automatic Shunt Adjustment  
Consider Reactive Power Limits  
Active Power Control As dispatched.  x 
According to Primary/Secondary Control  
According to inertias  
Considering Active Power Limits x 
Balancing of Production/Load By Reference Machine  
By Slack Bus x 
Distributed Slack by Loads  
Distributed Slack by Generation (Synch. Generators)  
Load Options Voltage dependencies checked at nearest bus x 
Table 3.23 - Load Flow Settings for Case 1 
Method Connectivity Analysis  
Load Flow Analysis x 
Network Distribution  
Transmission x 
Contingency Definition Lines/Cables x 
Transformers x 
Common Mode  
Independent Second Failures  
Protection Failure  
Fault Clearance Breakers Use All Circuit Breakers  
Use Switches With Protection 
Devices Only 
x 
Switching Procedure Concurrently x 
Sequential  
Consider Sectionalizing  
Time to open switches manually 60 min  
Voltage limits 0.95 p.u. < u < 1.05 p.u.  
Thermal Constraints Maximum thermal loading 100% 
Islanding Capability Black Start  
Ride Through  
Table 3.24 - Reliability Assessment Settings Case 1 
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The system analysis summary is shown in table 3.25. Given the relatively complicated structure of 
the grid it is difficult to assess whether or not the 66 MWh/a suggested in the simulation results are 
accurate.  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| System Summary                                                                                                                   
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| System Average Interruption Frequency Index          :  SAIFI  =    1,030745 1/Ca                                                
| Customer Average Interruption Frequency Index        :  CAIFI  =    1,030745 1/Ca                                                
| System Average Interruption Duration Index           :  SAIDI  =    3,763    h/Ca                                                
| Customer Average Interruption Duration Index         :  CAIDI  =    3,651    h                                                   
| Average Service Availability Index                   :  ASAI   =    0,9995704164                                                 
| Average Service Unavailability Index                 :  ASUI   =    0,0004295836                                                 
| Energy Not Supplied                                  :  ENS    =   65,979    MWh/a                                               
| Average Energy Not Supplied                          :  AENS   =    2,999    MWh/Ca                                              
| Average Customer Curtailment Index                   :  ACCI   =    4,773    MWh/Ca                                              
| Expected Interruption Cost                           :  EIC    =    0,000    M$/a                                                
| Interrupted Energy Assessment Rate                   :  IEAR   =    0,000    $/kWh                                               
| System energy shed                                   :  SES    =    0,000    MWh/a                                               
| Average System Interruption Frequency Index          :  ASIFI  =    0,912319 1/a                                                 
| Average System Interruption Duration Index           :  ASIDI  =    3,298865 h/a                                                 
| Momentary Average Interruption Frequency Index       :  MAIFI  =    0,000000 1/Ca                                                
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 3.25 - Case 1 Analysis Results 
 
- One thing that can be deducted with certainty is that there is a limiting factor in the two main 
transformers connecting the 33 kV bus to the 11 kV bus. These transformers are 16 MVA each. 
Fallout in one of the transformers in this case scenario would lead to a supply of maximum 16 
MW. This is 4 MW short of the 20 MW load implemented in the scenario. If we factor in that the 
average outage time of these main transformers is 1.8 [h] we can estimate the ENS supplied 
from these two transformers alone.  
                                      [
 
              
]        
   
 
  
- One other step we can do to get more clarity about the analysis result is to run an auxiliary 
analysis. In this analysis you can replace all disconnectors with circuit breakers to see how much 
of the ENS that is caused by the sectionalizing. Circuit breakers with relay systems detect failures 
close to them instantly, and can trip instantly. Thus no sectionalizing will be required. From table 
3.26 we can see that such a scenario produces an ENS of about 62.56 MWh/a. Subtracting this 
from the original ENS from table 3.25 shows that sectionalizing is directly responsible for about 
4.5 MWh/a of ENS.  
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| System Summary                                                                                                                   
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| System Average Interruption Frequency Index          :  SAIFI  =    0,788789 1/Ca                                                
| Customer Average Interruption Frequency Index        :  CAIFI  =    0,788789 1/Ca                                                
| System Average Interruption Duration Index           :  SAIDI  =    3,521    h/Ca                                                
| Customer Average Interruption Duration Index         :  CAIDI  =    4,464    h                                                   
| Average Service Availability Index                   :  ASAI   =    0,9995980371                                                 
| Average Service Unavailability Index                 :  ASUI   =    0,0004019629                                                 
| Energy Not Supplied                                  :  ENS    =   62,560    MWh/a                                               
| Average Energy Not Supplied                          :  AENS   =    2,844    MWh/Ca                                              
| Average Customer Curtailment Index                   :  ACCI   =    5,284    MWh/Ca                                              
| Expected Interruption Cost                           :  EIC    =    0,000    M$/a                                                
| Interrupted Energy Assessment Rate                   :  IEAR   =    0,000    $/kWh                                               
| System energy shed                                   :  SES    =    0,000    MWh/a                                               
| Average System Interruption Frequency Index          :  ASIFI  =    0,741350 1/a                                                 
| Average System Interruption Duration Index           :  ASIDI  =    3,127897 h/a                                                 
| Momentary Average Interruption Frequency Index       :  MAIFI  =    0,000000 1/Ca                                                
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 3.26 - Base Case Analysis Results utilizing all Disconnectors as Circuit Breakers 
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- Thirdly, adding all the individual transformer failures up we can get another indicator of where 
the minimum ENS for the base case should be. Each distribution transformer is supplying about 
between 0.75 [MW] and 1.9 [MW] of load. We use 0.75[MW] to get a minimum estimate They 
have an average annual outage expectancy of 3 [h].   
                                   [
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]     
   
 
  
Adding these estimates together we get:  
45 [MWh/a] + 14.4 [MWh/a] + 4.5 [MWh/a] = 63.9 [MWh/a] 
This might seem a bit too close to the original 66 [MWh/a] ENS displayed in table 3.25, but the only 
ENS lacking in these estimates is the topology contribution to ENS from the lines, which is normally 
relatively small when not including the sectionalizing contribution to ENS. The base case result 
provided here should be close to the intended value.  
2. Distributed Generation Case 
When including a DG generator in this net, it is prudent to note that this net was never intended for 
DG and/or islanding. Most of the ENS contribution in this net comes from the distribution 
transformers themselves. This type of ENS will not be alleviated by any DG placement. The DG 
chosen will be put on the main bus, as indicated in figure 3.5. 
 
Figure 3.5 - DG Unit Placement in Case 2 
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  The DG unit will be equipped with a maximum capacity that is double that of the total load in the 
grid. This is not strictly necessary for this modeling scenario, but 
since the model was constructed after BC Hydro guidelines 40 MVA 
was implemented in case other aspects were to be modeled. From 
table 3.30 we can see that ride through will be the mode of 
analysis. Black start modeling is possible to model, but if a ride 
through does not give decisive improvements to ENS, there is little use in performing a less reliable 
analysis with an even smaller implication for ENS.  
 
Method Connectivity Analysis  
Load Flow Analysis x 
Network Distribution  
Transmission x 
Contingency Definition Lines/Cables x 
Transformers x 
Common Mode  
Independent Second Failures  
Protection Failure  
Fault Clearance Breakers Use All Circuit Breakers  
Use Switches With Protection 
Devices Only 
x 
Switching Procedure Concurrently x 
Sequential  
Consider Sectionalizing  
Time to open switches manually 60 min  
Voltage limits 0.95 p.u. < u < 1.05 p.u.  
Thermal Constraints Maximum thermal loading 100% 
Islanding Capability Black Start  
Ride Through x 
Table 3.29 - Reliability Assessment Settings for Case 2 
Capacity  40 [MVA] 
Type Synchronous 
Dispatch 20 [MW] 
Table 3.27 - DG Unit Specifications 
Calculation Method AC Load Flow. Balanced Positive Sequence x 
DC Load Flow (linear)  
Reactive Power Control Automatic Tap Adjustment of Transformers  
Automatic Shunt Adjustment  
Consider Reactive Power Limits  
Active Power Control As dispatched.  x 
According to Primary/Secondary Control  
According to inertias  
Considering Active Power Limits x 
Balancing of Production/Load By Reference Machine x 
By Slack Bus  
Distributed Slack by Loads  
Distributed Slack by Generation (Synch. Generators)  
Load Options Voltage dependencies checked at nearest bus x 
Table 3.28 - Load Flow Settings for Case 2 
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--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| System Summary                                                                                                                   
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| System Average Interruption Frequency Index          :  SAIFI  =    0,355745 1/Ca                                                
| Customer Average Interruption Frequency Index        :  CAIFI  =    0,355745 1/Ca                                                
| System Average Interruption Duration Index           :  SAIDI  =    3,682    h/Ca                                                
| Customer Average Interruption Duration Index         :  CAIDI  =   10,351    h                                                   
| Average Service Availability Index                   :  ASAI   =    0,9995796630                                                 
| Average Service Unavailability Index                 :  ASUI   =    0,0004203370                                                 
| Energy Not Supplied                                  :  ENS    =   64,419    MWh/a                                               
| Average Energy Not Supplied                          :  AENS   =    2,928    MWh/Ca                                              
| Average Customer Curtailment Index                   :  ACCI   =   10,847    MWh/Ca                                              
| Expected Interruption Cost                           :  EIC    =    0,000    M$/a                                                
| Interrupted Energy Assessment Rate                   :  IEAR   =    0,000    $/kWh                                               
| System energy shed                                   :  SES    =    0,000    MWh/a                                               
| Average System Interruption Frequency Index          :  ASIFI  =    0,261933 1/a                                                 
| Average System Interruption Duration Index           :  ASIDI  =    3,220844 h/a                                                 
| Momentary Average Interruption Frequency Index       :  MAIFI  =    0,000000 1/Ca                                                
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 3.30 - Case 2 Reliability Assessment Summary 
The ENS simulation result outputted by the simulation is somewhat puzzling. There is an overlap 
between sectioning contributions to ENS and topology contributions to ENS, but in this modeling 
case it was expected that at least most of the 14.4 MWh/a ENS contribution from the two main 
transformers were to be eliminated. Since the two transformers have a very low interruption 
frequency and high repair duration a DG alleviating the outage should have had big impact 
considering how little contribution sectioning would have had in that case.  
 
3. Protection Failure Case 
The implications for a DG unit placed at the main bus in this scenario would have negligible influence 
since all branches off the bus are isolated by circuit breakers. If the whole grid was setup with circuit 
breakers with failure rates, there would be notably or even big implications for the ENS. Alas, this 
report has not been able to provide good results for circuit breaker failure cases.  
 
 
3.2.1 Summary of RBTS net Analysis Result 
- Case 1: Base case 
- Case 2: Islanding mode enabled on installed generator 
o Refitting circuit breakers with proper two way relay system 
o Sufficient AVR and frequency regulating mechanism for Generators 
o Generator 
o Synchronization equipment for reconnecting to external grid 
o Engineered mass for generators 
o Telematics and independently supplied communication equipment for contacting net 
operator 
- Case 3: Protection Failure Case 
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  ENS [MWh/a] 
 ENS in percentage 
of base case 
SAIFI [1/a] 
SAIFI as percentage 
of base case 
Case 1 65,979 - 1,03 - 
Case 2 64,419 97,6% 0,3557 34,5% 
Case 3 - - - - 
Table 3.31 - ENS and SAIFI summary for the RBTS net 
  
KILE 
[NOK/a] 
 KILE as percentage 
of base case 
Accumulated KILE over 20 years 
with 3% discount rate [NOK] 
Saving from base case 
over 20 years [NOK] 
Case 1 71224 - 1 971 230 - 
Case 2 69540 97,64 % 1 924 623 46 607 
Table 3.32- KILE summary for the RBTS net 
As has been mentioned in the analysis of RBTS this grid is not very well suited for responding to 
islanding measures to reduce ENS. This is not a real net and the “local” contributions to ENS are far to 
big to give the islanded generator any impact. A reduction in SAIFI is the only real asset here, and it 
can be discussed how valuable this is to a household supply radial.  
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3.3 Snåsa 
Figure 3.6 shows the Snåsa grid as It was presented in a master thesis by Tina Bystøl (25). It is a radial 
distribution grid which is being considered for DG unit implementation. The DG units that are being 
considered are drawn in figure 3.6 as DG1 (4.2 MW), DG2 (2.1 MW), DG3 (2.6 MW) and DG4 (2.1 
MW). DG5 (13.1 MW) is also considered for implementation in the Snåsa grid, but due to its size a 
line will have to be built from the bus where DG5 is located in this drawing (BUS10 in the model) 
connecting it directly to the Snåsa node. The lines and cables have been modeled after standard FeAl 
lines as described in the SINTEF report “Distribusjonsnettet i Norge” (26). Because DG5 requires an 
extra line and therefore breaks the radial structure of the grid it will not be considered for analysis. 
The placement of protection systems and relays has not been given in the original thesis, but in this 
thesis it is assumed that every generator is behind a circuit breaker, the main grid is isolated by a 
circuit breaker and that disconnectors are located around every bus. Circuit breaker placement is 
marked as black cubicles in figure 3.6. 
 Capacity Voltage Type Bus Placement 
DG 1 4.6 MVA   6.6 kV   Synch. Bus  4 
DG 2 2.1 MW 0.69 kV Asynch. Bus 14 
DG 3 2.6 MVA   6.6 kV   Synch. Bus 15 
DG 4 2.1 MVA   6.6 kV   Synch. Bus 13 
DG 5 - - - Bus 10 
Table 3.33 - DG Unit Component Data for Snåsa Grid 
 
Different analysis cases will be considered and performed on this grid. The data presented in the 
Bystøl master is a heavy load scenario with a total load of 7MW distributed as shown in table 3.35 on 
the next page.  
  
 
Figure 3.6 - Snåsa grid one line schematics 
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 Active Power Reactive Power 
BUS 3 2.71 MW 0.71 MVAr 
BUS 5 1.05 MW 0.25 MVAr 
BUS 6 1 MW 0.1 MVAr 
BUS 7 0.55 MW 0.09 MVAr 
BUS 8 0.55 MW 0.09 MVAr 
BUS 9 0.55 MW 0.09 MVAr 
BUS 10 0.55 MW 0.09 MVAr 
Table 3.34 - Load Data in the Snåsa Grid During Heavy Load Scenario 
 
Figure 3.7 depicts the original load flow model in NetBas.  Here you can also see the extra line 
intended to support DG 5. It is located between bus 10 and bus 1 and is indicated as a dotted line.  
 
Figure 3.7 - Load Placements and Bus Numbers for the Snåsa Grid 
 
Reliability Data and Protection Relays 
The reliability data provided for 
Snåsa are the same as those who 
are logged for Line A, according to 
Rune Paulsen, senior engineer at 
NTE Nett. NTE Nett is the grid 
operator responsible for Snåsa 
and Line A. The interruption 
frequency of the external grid is noted to be very big. It is also similar in size to the average failure 
frequency logged by Statnett in each region in the transmission grid. The average failure rate of the 
 Repair Duration Interruption Frequency 
Transformer 12   [h] 0.05 [1/a] 
External Grid 1.507 [h] 5.604      [1/a] 
Lines 3.55   [h] 0.0041    [1/a*km] 
Cables 7.7     [h] 0.0215    [1/a*km] 
Generators 50      [h] 5              [1/a] 
Table 3.35 - Reliability Data for the Snåsa Grid 
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transmission grid will not equal the interruption frequency experienced by each load point/feeder 
branch-off in that region. However, 5.6 [interruptions/a] is the frequency logged in NTE Nett’s system 
and will therefore be the operating parameter in this paper.  
As for protection devices, they were not given in the original material and have been implemented as 
per the standard of this paper. Circuit breakers isolate all generators and the external grid. All nodes, 
loads and components are connected through disconnectors. 
 
1. Base Case Heavy Load 
This case uses the same relevant parameters and dispatches as the original modeling case. To 
simulate a radial solely consisting of loads all branches containing generators have been removed for 
this case. This means that the Snåsa grid gets a very basic design as demonstrated in figure 3.8. 
 
Figure 3.8 - Snåsa Grid Radial Structure Stripped of Generator Branches 
A basic distribution reliability analysis is run using the settings displayed in table 3.37 and3.38 on the 
next page. As the only mitigating measure that is possible to perform in such a basic grid is 
sectioning. The resulting ENS is easily verifiable. There is only one transformer in this grid, and all line 
interruption frequencies are very small. This means that the majority of the outage time will consist 
of the main transformer outage duration and the external grid outage duration. An estimate can be 
done by multiplying the average outage times of these two components with the total load of the 
grid. 
                             (   [
 
 
]     [
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Calculation Method AC Load Flow. Balanced Positive Sequence x 
DC Load Flow (linear)  
Reactive Power Control Automatic Tap Adjustment of Transformers  
Automatic Shunt Adjustment  
Consider Reactive Power Limits  
Active Power Control As dispatched.   
According to Primary/Secondary Control  
According to inertias  
Considering Active Power Limits x 
Balancing of Production/Load By Reference Machine  
By Slack Bus x 
Distributed Slack by Loads  
Distributed Slack by Generation (Synch. Generators)  
Load Options Voltage dependencies checked at nearest bus  
Table 3.36 - Case 1 Load Flow Settings 
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Method Connectivity Analysis x 
Load Flow Analysis  
Network Distribution x 
Transmission  
Contingency Definition Lines/Cables x 
Transformers x 
Common Mode  
Independent Second Failures x 
Protection Failure  
Fault Clearance Breakers Use All Circuit Breakers  
Use Switches With Protection 
Devices Only 
x 
Switching Procedure Concurrently x 
Sequential  
Consider Sectionalizing x 
Time to open switches manually 60 min  
Voltage limits 0.9 p.u. < u < 1.1 p.u. x 
Thermal Constraints Maximum thermal loading 100% 
Islanding Capability Black Start  
Ride Through  
Table 3.37 - Reliability Assessment Settings for Case 1 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| System Summary                                                                                                                   
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| System Average Interruption Frequency Index          :  SAIFI  =    5,717459 1/Ca                                                
| Customer Average Interruption Frequency Index        :  CAIFI  =    5,717459 1/Ca                                                
| System Average Interruption Duration Index           :  SAIDI  =   10,905    h/Ca                                                
| Customer Average Interruption Duration Index         :  CAIDI  =    1,907    h                                                   
| Average Service Availability Index                   :  ASAI   =    0,9987551528                                                 
| Average Service Unavailability Index                 :  ASUI   =    0,0012448472                                                 
| Energy Not Supplied                                  :  ENS    =   75,677    MWh/a                                               
| Average Energy Not Supplied                          :  AENS   =   10,811    MWh/Ca                                              
| Average Customer Curtailment Index                   :  ACCI   =   10,334    MWh/Ca                                              
| Expected Interruption Cost                           :  EIC    =    0,000    M$/a                                                
| Interrupted Energy Assessment Rate                   :  IEAR   =    0,000    $/kWh                                               
| System energy shed                                   :  SES    =    0,000    MWh/a                                               
| Average System Interruption Frequency Index          :  ASIFI  =    5,709021 1/a                                                 
| Average System Interruption Duration Index           :  ASIDI  =   10,873109 h/a                                                 
| Momentary Average Interruption Frequency Index       :  MAIFI  =    0,000000 1/Ca                                                
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 3.38 - Reliability Analysis Results for Case 1 
As can be seen there is only 7.7 kWh more ENS in the complete simulation as compared to the 
estimate. The estimate will include some of the sectioning time contribution to the ENS, so the 
topology contribution here is probably bigger than 7.7 kWh, but not much. Given the low line length 
and very low interruption frequency per kilometer this result seems likely. 
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2. DG Units Set to Ride Through Islanding 
In this case all the generator branches are connected to the model again, as depicted in figure 3.6. 
The dispatch is set to around 80% of maximum dispatch capacity as displayed in 3.40. There is a little 
more production capacity than load in the grid now.  A 
ride through scenario is chosen. This makes modeling 
easier, but given that most of the outage duration in 
the grid comes from the external grid and main 
transformer choke point, a black start would probably 
have been almost equally effective when accounting for 
ENS alone. As can be seen from table 3.42, the ENS is drastically reduced. Since line contribution to 
ENS is very low, most of the remaining ENS contribution can be assumed to come from the generator 
transformers. A quick simulation reveals that ENS without generator transformer failure results in an 
ENS of about 3.353 MWh/a. This is only about a 1.65 MWh/a reduction in ENS as a consequence 
transformer failure and sectioning time.  
 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| System Summary                                                                                                                   
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| System Average Interruption Frequency Index          :  SAIFI  =    0,401816 1/Ca                                                
| Customer Average Interruption Frequency Index        :  CAIFI  =    0,401816 1/Ca                                                
| System Average Interruption Duration Index           :  SAIDI  =    0,939    h/Ca                                                
| Customer Average Interruption Duration Index         :  CAIDI  =    2,336    h                                                   
| Average Service Availability Index                   :  ASAI   =    0,9998928297                                                 
| Average Service Unavailability Index                 :  ASUI   =    0,0001071703                                                 
| Energy Not Supplied                                  :  ENS    =    4,888    MWh/a                                               
| Average Energy Not Supplied                          :  AENS   =    0,698    MWh/Ca                                              
| Average Customer Curtailment Index                   :  ACCI   =    4,670    MWh/Ca                                              
| Expected Interruption Cost                           :  EIC    =    0,000    M$/a                                                
| Interrupted Energy Assessment Rate                   :  IEAR   =    0,000    $/kWh                                               
| System energy shed                                   :  SES    =    1,840    MWh/a                                               
| Average System Interruption Frequency Index          :  ASIFI  =    0,288934 1/a                                                 
| Average System Interruption Duration Index           :  ASIDI  =    0,702279 h/a                                                 
| Momentary Average Interruption Frequency Index       :  MAIFI  =    0,000000 1/Ca                                                
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 3.41 - Case 2 Reliability Assessment Results 
 
 Active Power Reactive Power 
DG 1     2 MW 0.31 MVAr 
DG 2      1 MW 0.69 MVAr 
DG 3      2 MW 0 MVAr 
DG 4      2 MW 0.57 MVAr 
Table 3.39 DG Unit Dispatch for Case 2 
Calculation Method AC Load Flow. Balanced Positive Sequence x 
DC Load Flow (linear)  
Reactive Power Control Automatic Tap Adjustment of Transformers  
Automatic Shunt Adjustment  
Consider Reactive Power Limits x 
Active Power Control As dispatched.  x 
According to Primary/Secondary Control  
According to inertias  
Considering Active Power Limits x 
Balancing of Production/Load By Reference Machine  
By Slack Bus x 
Distributed Slack by Loads  
Distributed Slack by Generation (Synch. Generators)  
Load Options Voltage dependencies checked at nearest bus x 
Table 3.40 - Load Flow Settings for Case 2 
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Method Connectivity Analysis  
Load Flow Analysis x 
Network Distribution  
Transmission x 
Contingency Definition Lines/Cables x 
Transformers x 
Common Mode  
Independent Second Failures  
Protection Failure  
Fault Clearance Breakers Use All Circuit Breakers  
Use Switches With Protection 
Devices Only 
x 
Switching Procedure Concurrently x 
Sequential  
Consider Sectionalizing x 
Time to open switches manually 60 min  
Voltage limits 0.9 p.u. < u < 1.1 p.u. x 
Thermal Constraints Maximum thermal loading 100% 
Islanding Capability Black Start  
Ride Through x 
Table 3.42 - Reliability Assessment Settings for Case 2 
 
3. Effects of Failure in DG Unit Circuit Breakers 
Before estimating the impact of circuit breaker failure, a complete simulation with no islanding had 
to be conducted. This time the branches with generators on them were included in the simulation. 
Then the impact of each DG unit has to be added to this simulations output ENS.  
The general formula for finding the ENS contribution for a DG unit circuit breaker failure is linear and 
very basic during independent events. Since it is assumed that even though a circuit breaker failure 
occurs, the DG can still be 
tripped by using the circuit 
breaker as a disconnector 
or by using the 
disconnectors connecting 
the grid to the generator transformer. This analysis also assumes independent contingencies. This 
means that when a generator experiences a contingency, the external grid will be able to supply 
power, leaving only sectioning time contributions to ENS. The formula for calculating the extra ENS 
under these circumstances becomes the equation shown below. 
                                      
Where N is the number of generators,     is the interruption frequency of the generator,       is the 
sectioning time,          is the failure rate of the circuit breaker and          is the total grid load. In 
the Snåsa case, this equation would give us the following result. 
           [
 
 
]                      
   
 
   
 Interruption Frequency Repair Time 
Generator Failure Characteristics 5 [1/a]   50 [h] 
Circuit Breaker Failure Rate 1.3 % failure to trip during contingency 
Table 3.43 - Failure Characteristics for DG Units and Circuit Breakers 
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Method Connectivity Analysis  
Load Flow Analysis x 
Network Distribution  
Transmission x 
Contingency Definition Lines/Cables x 
Transformers x 
Common Mode  
Independent Second Failures  
Protection Failure  
Fault Clearance Breakers Use All Circuit Breakers  
Use Switches With Protection 
Devices Only 
x 
Switching Procedure Concurrently x 
Sequential  
Consider Sectionalizing x 
Time to open switches manually 60 min  
Voltage limits 0.9 p.u. < u < 1.1 p.u. x 
Thermal Constraints Maximum thermal loading 100% 
Islanding Capability Black Start  
Ride Through  
Table 3.45 - Case 3 Reliability Assessment Settings 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| System Summary                                                                                                                   
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| System Average Interruption Frequency Index          :  SAIFI  =    5,792652 1/Ca                                                
| Customer Average Interruption Frequency Index        :  CAIFI  =    5,792652 1/Ca                                                
| System Average Interruption Duration Index           :  SAIDI  =   10,980    h/Ca                                                
| Customer Average Interruption Duration Index         :  CAIDI  =    1,896    h                                                   
| Average Service Availability Index                   :  ASAI   =    0,9987465691                                                 
| Average Service Unavailability Index                 :  ASUI   =    0,0012534309                                                 
| Energy Not Supplied                                  :  ENS    =   76,256    MWh/a                                               
| Average Energy Not Supplied                          :  AENS   =   10,894    MWh/Ca                                              
| Average Customer Curtailment Index                   :  ACCI   =    9,506    MWh/Ca                                              
| System energy shed                                   :  SES    =    0,000    MWh/a                                               
| Average System Interruption Frequency Index          :  ASIFI  =    5,792256 1/a                                                 
| Average System Interruption Duration Index           :  ASIDI  =   10,956349 h/a                                                 
| Momentary Average Interruption Frequency Index       :  MAIFI  =    0,000000 1/Ca                                                
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 3.46 - Case 3 Reliability Assessment Results 
Calculation Method AC Load Flow. Balanced Positive Sequence x 
DC Load Flow (linear)  
Reactive Power Control Automatic Tap Adjustment of Transformers  
Automatic Shunt Adjustment  
Consider Reactive Power Limits x 
Active Power Control As dispatched.  x 
According to Primary/Secondary Control  
According to inertias  
Considering Active Power Limits x 
Balancing of Production/Load By Reference Machine  
By Slack Bus x 
Distributed Slack by Loads  
Distributed Slack by Generation (Synch. Generators)  
Load Options Voltage dependencies checked at nearest bus x 
Table 3.44 - Case 3 Load Flow Analysis Settings 
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Now adding the two ENS results for the grid and the generator circuit breakers gets us the ENS we 
are looking for. 
                       [
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3.3.1 Summary of Snåsa Case Results 
- Case 1: Base case 
- Case 2: DG units set to ride through islanding mode 
o Refitting circuit breakers with proper two way relay system 
o Sufficient AVR and frequency regulating mechanism for generators 
o Synchronization equipment for reconnecting to external grid 
o Engineered mass for generators 
o Telematics and independently supplied communication equipment for contacting net 
operator 
- Case 3: Failure effects in DG generators 
  ENS [MWh/a] 
 ENS in percentage 
of base case 
SAIFI [1/a] 
SAIFI as percentage 
of base case 
Case 1 75,677 - 5,72 - 
Case 2 4,888 6,46% 0,40 7% 
Case 3 78,076 103,2% 5,79 101,2% 
Table 3.47 - ENS and SAIFI summary for the Snåsa grid 
 
  
KILE 
[NOK/a] 
 KILE as percentage 
of base case 
Accumulated KILE over 20 years 
with 3% discount rate [NOK] 
Saving from base case 
over 20 years [NOK] 
Case 1 81693 - 2 260 975 - 
Case 2 5276 6,46 % 146 021 2 115 000 
Case 3 84283 103,17 % 2 332 657 -716 820 
Table 3.48 - KILE summary for Test Net A 
Given that Snåsa actually experiences as big an exposure to central grid fallout as is claimed, there 
are economic incentives here to justify an investment of two million over a period of twenty years. 
The uncertain nature of an untried technique lacking assembly band solutions however, this is 
probably not enough to justify an investment.     
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3.4 Øie-Kvinesdal 
The Øie-Kvinesdal grid is a radial with ample DG production. The base case as described in the report 
“Distribusjonsnett 2020” (27) contains some voltage problems at the end of the radial (around 
Knabeheia) which will have to be considered when working through the different contingency 
scenarios. The line data for the original model was not available, so standard values for FeAl lines 
were chosen from Distribusjonsnettet i Norge- oppbygning, komponenter og data (26). The load flow 
analysis of the base case scenario seemed consistent with what was found in the Distribusjonsnett 
2020 report. This will later be discussed in the base case section of the analysis.  
 
Figure 3.9 - Kvinesdal-Øie one line schematics 
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The DG units are implemented in the Øie-
Kvinesdal model as described in the original 
report.  
However, voltage regulators and impedances 
for generators were not implemented quite as 
meticulously as in the Distribusjonsnett 
2020 report. This is partly because this 
thesis does not evaluate any dynamic 
analysis, and partly because PowerFactory 
and Netbas do not seem to model 
generators in the same way.  This should 
not be of grave importance as any scenario 
with voltages outside the acceptable range or 
contingency topologies which can’t fulfill the voltage requirements will have to be mediated before a 
reliability assessment can be performed in PowerFactory. The impedances and other parameters 
used in the Distribusjonsnett 2020 report describing these generators can be found in the appendix.  
The reliability data in table 3.53 are rough estimates calculated from the Årsstatistikk 2010 (23) by 
Statnett.  
Connection 
Node 
Capacity 
[MVA] 
Nominal 
Voltage [kV] 
Generator 
Type 
Distance from main 
grid feeder [km] 
Role 
KVINE-6-G1 1,6 6 Synchronous 7,46  
TRÆLA-5-A 12,5 5,25 Synchronous 6,69 Swing Gen 
OKS_KR-0.4 0,5 0,69 Asynchronous 19,12  
BER_KR-G 0,8 0,69 Synchronous 36,87  
RØY_KR-G1 0,5 0,69 Synchronous 39,93  
RØY_KR-G2 1,05 0,69 Synchronous 39,93  
EFT_KR-G 0,625 0,23 Synchronous 41,59  
HIS_KR-G 4 6,6 Synchronous 46,05 Voltage Regulation 
Table 3.51 - Generator data (27) 
TRÆLA-5-A is chosen to be the swing generator in this model. This is because it’s necessary to have a 
DG unit with spacious capacity to pick up the slack when the external grid is disconnected. HIS_KR-G 
is in some cases used to produce reactive effect to keep the Knabeheia load within voltage 
boundaries.  To combat this same voltage drop at the end of the radial the stiff grid connected to the 
Øie node is set to 1.03 pu. to increase voltage throughout to the end. A shunt capacitor has been 
placed in the Knabeheia node to put the grid within Norwegian steady state voltage constraints. 
Normally tap changing the main 
transformer and the HIS_KR-22 
transformer would be enough, but 
as will be shown there are 
instances where this is not 
possible.  
 
 
Total Active Load in Radial 11 [MW] 
Total Reactive Load in Radial 0.73 [MVAr] 
Total Line Length in Radial 70 [km] 
Number of Load Points 5 
Sectioning Time 60 [min] 
Table 3.49 - Basic Data Øie-Kvinesdal 
 R’[ohm/km] X’[ohm/km] B’[ohm/km] 
22kV 
Line 
0,325 0,125 2e-6  
22kV 
Cable 
0,35 0,765 60e-6 
Table 3.50 - Øie-Kvinesdal Line Impedance Data 
 Interruption Frequency Outage Duration 
Line 0.00346  [1/a*km] 4         [h] 
Cable 0.00204  [1/a*km] 7         [h] 
Transformer 0.0066    [1/a] 8         [h] 
External Grid 0.12        [1/a] 0.675 [h] 
Table 3.52 - Øie-Kvinesdal Component Reliability Data 
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HV node LV node Capacity [MVA] er [p.u.] ex  [p.u.] Voltage [kV] 
KVINA-22-A KVINE-6-G1 1,6 0,005 0,07 22/6 
TRÆLA-22-A TRÆLA-5-A 6 0,008 0,0392 20/5,25 
TRÆLA-22-A TRÆLA-5-A 3,5 0,008 0,0392 20/5,25 
TH-83036 TL-83036 0,315 0,0122 0,0496 22/0,415 
BER_KR-22 BER_KR-G 1 0,006 0,06 22/0,69 
ROY_KR-22 ROY_KR0_69 1,6 0,0072 0,0583 22/0,69 
TH-85079 TL-85079 0,4 0,01 0,05 21/0,24 
HIS_KR-22 HIS_KR-6_6 4 0,006 0,06 22/6,6 
OIE-22-A OIE-110-A 25 0,0057 0,1239 100/22 
Table 3.53 - Transformer data 
 
1. Base Case 
The base case devised for Øie-Kvinesdal is a heavy load and no production scenario. This is done to 
test the basic load flow capabilities of the radial. The voltage level furthest out in the grid will be 
checked at the worst case scenario possible when only varying the loads and the dispatch. First off 
we will do a load flow assessment to see if normal 
load flow requirements are upheld. The buss 
furthest out in the grid, depicted in figure 3.9 as 
TH-85012, upholds the 0,9 [p.u.] limit barely. The 
10% voltage limit was upheld because the external 
grid was set to 1.06 [p.u.]. This paper does not aim 
to improve voltage quality in itself, so satisfying 
the legal constraints will in this paper be 
considered to be sufficient. 
 
 
 
Power[MW] Reactive Power[MVAr] 
L1 1,69 0 
L2 4,37 0 
L3 1 0,15 
L4 0,2 0,15 
L5 3,68 0,43 
Table 3.54 - Load parameters in heavy load scenario 
Calculation Method AC Load Flow. Balanced Positive Sequence x 
DC Load Flow (linear)  
Reactive Power Control Automatic Tap Adjustment of Transformers x 
Automatic Shunt Adjustment  
Consider Reactive Power Limits x 
Active Power Control As dispatched.  x 
According to Primary/Secondary Control  
According to inertias  
Considering Active Power Limits x 
Balancing of Production/Load By Reference Machine  
By Slack Bus x 
Distributed Slack by Loads  
Distributed Slack by Generation (Synch. Generators)  
Load Options Voltage dependencies checked at nearest bus x 
Table 3.55 - Load Flow Settings for Case 1 
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Method Connectivity Analysis  
Load Flow Analysis x 
Network Distribution  
Transmission x 
Contingency Definition Lines/Cables x 
Transformers x 
Common Mode  
Independent Second Failures  
Protection Failure  
Fault Clearance Breakers Use All Circuit Breakers  
Use Switches With Protection 
Devices Only 
x 
Switching Procedure Concurrently x 
Sequential  
Consider Sectionalizing x 
Time to open switches manually 60 min  
Voltage limits 0.9 p.u. < u < 1.1 p.u.  
Thermal Constraints Maximum thermal loading 80% 
Islanding Capability Black Start  
Ride Through  
Table 3.56 - Reliability Assessment Settings for Case 1 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| System Summary                                                                                                                   
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| System Average Interruption Frequency Index          :  SAIFI  =    2,000149 1/Ca                                                
| Customer Average Interruption Frequency Index        :  CAIFI  =    2,000149 1/Ca                                                
| System Average Interruption Duration Index           :  SAIDI  =    5,347    h/Ca                                                
| Customer Average Interruption Duration Index         :  CAIDI  =    2,673    h                                                   
| Average Service Availability Index                   :  ASAI   =    0,9993896575                                                 
| Average Service Unavailability Index                 :  ASUI   =    0,0006103425                                                 
| Energy Not Supplied                                  :  ENS    =   48,883    MWh/a                                               
| Average Energy Not Supplied                          :  AENS   =    9,777    MWh/Ca                                              
| Average Customer Curtailment Index                   :  ACCI   =    6,706    MWh/Ca                                              
| Expected Interruption Cost                           :  EIC    =    0,000    M$/a                                                
| Interrupted Energy Assessment Rate                   :  IEAR   =    0,000    $/kWh                                               
| System energy shed                                   :  SES    =    0,000    MWh/a                                               
| Average System Interruption Frequency Index          :  ASIFI  =    1,910659 1/a                                                 
| Average System Interruption Duration Index           :  ASIDI  =    4,468282 h/a                                                 
| Momentary Average Interruption Frequency Index       :  MAIFI  =    0,000000 1/Ca                                                
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 3.57 - Case 1 Analysis Results 
If a standard estimate is done to check the ENS resulting from sectioning outage time for the 
complete line length and all transformers we get the following estimate. 
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Now looking at the choke point consisting of the main transformer and the external grid we can get 
an estimate on what kind of ENS choke point outage time would add. This estimate is done by 
multiplying their average outage duration with the total load.  
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These two estimates adds up to an ENS of 37.55 [MWh/a]. This leaves us with a topology induced 
ENS of a little more than 11 [MWh/a]. Despite the low interruption frequency, the total line length 
makes this result seem plausible.  
 
2. Islanding Capabilities on DG Units 
When exploring the islanding capabilities of the Øie-Kvinesdal case, 
we can start by noting that the total max capacity of the generators 
is roughly the size of the total heavy load. The Træla generator in 
itself could in theory supply the whole grid load of 11 MW with its 
12.5 MVA capacity. Putting such a generator as a reference 
machine makes the transparency of the analysis much better. 
Sensitivity analyzing and evaluating the impact of different 
dispatches can give confusing results which needs to be trouble 
shooted. Using Træla as reference machine provides results that 
are easier to interpret and more consistent. The other generators 
are dispatched at around 80% of their capacity. Voltage levels are easier to uphold now that 
generators can be used to dispatch reactive power, and automatic tap changing is engaged. 
 
Table 3.62 on the next page shows us that the simulation results gives us an ENS of about 32.3 
MWh/a. It is difficult to precisely assess the legitimacy of this result, but we can note that the base 
case heavy load scenario ENS minus the choke point ENS from outage time on the main transformer 
and the external grid should give us an upper limit estimate to what we can assume the case 2 ENS to 
be. On the other hand, outage due to sectionalizing time will give us a lower limit. The reason 
sectionalizing time can be used to define a lower limit is that whenever a fault occurs inside the 
circuit breaker isolating the Øie-Kvinesdal radial from the external grid the complete radial will have 
to be de-energized.  
 
 Dispatched 
Active Power  
KVINE-6-G1 1.4  [MW] 
TRÆLA-5-A 0     [MW] 
OKS_KR-0.4 3.5  [MW] 
BER_KR-G 0.6  [MW] 
RØY_KR-G1 0.4  [MW] 
RØY_KR-G2 0.8  [MW] 
EFT_KR-G 0.5  [MW] 
HIS_KR-G 3.5  [MW] 
Table 3.58 - Case 2 Generator Dispatch 
Calculation Method AC Load Flow. Balanced Positive Sequence x 
DC Load Flow (linear)  
Reactive Power Control Automatic Tap Adjustment of Transformers x 
Automatic Shunt Adjustment  
Consider Reactive Power Limits x 
Active Power Control As dispatched.  x 
According to Primary/Secondary Control  
According to inertias  
Considering Active Power Limits x 
Balancing of Production/Load By Reference Machine x 
By Slack Bus  
Distributed Slack by Loads  
Distributed Slack by Generation (Synch. Generators)  
Load Options Voltage dependencies checked at nearest bus x 
Table 3.59 - Case 2 Load Flow Analysis Settings 
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The obtained 32.3 MWh/a estimate falls safely in between these two limits.  
Method Connectivity Analysis  
Load Flow Analysis x 
Network Distribution  
Transmission x 
Contingency Definition Lines/Cables x 
Transformers x 
Common Mode  
Independent Second Failures  
Protection Failure  
Fault Clearance Breakers Use All Circuit Breakers  
Use Switches With Protection 
Devices Only 
x 
Switching Procedure Concurrently x 
Sequential  
Consider Sectionalizing x 
Time to open switches manually 60 min  
Voltage limits 0.9 p.u. < u < 1.1 p.u.  
Thermal Constraints Maximum thermal loading 80% 
Islanding Capability Black Start  
Ride Through x 
Table 3.60 - Case 2 Reliability Assessment Settings 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| System Summary                                                                                                                   
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| System Average Interruption Frequency Index          :  SAIFI  =    0,796779 1/Ca                                                
| Customer Average Interruption Frequency Index        :  CAIFI  =    0,796779 1/Ca                                                
| System Average Interruption Duration Index           :  SAIDI  =    3,229    h/Ca                                                
| Customer Average Interruption Duration Index         :  CAIDI  =    4,053    h                                                   
| Average Service Availability Index                   :  ASAI   =    0,9996313519                                                 
| Average Service Unavailability Index                 :  ASUI   =    0,0003686481                                                 
| Energy Not Supplied                                  :  ENS    =   32,289    MWh/a                                               
| Average Energy Not Supplied                          :  AENS   =    6,458    MWh/Ca                                              
| Average Customer Curtailment Index                   :  ACCI   =   13,699    MWh/Ca                                              
| Expected Interruption Cost                           :  EIC    =    0,000    M$/a                                                
| Interrupted Energy Assessment Rate                   :  IEAR   =    0,000    $/kWh                                               
| System energy shed                                   :  SES    =    0,000    MWh/a                                               
| Average System Interruption Frequency Index          :  ASIFI  =    0,733349 1/a                                                 
| Average System Interruption Duration Index           :  ASIDI  =    2,951481 h/a                                                 
| Momentary Average Interruption Frequency Index       :  MAIFI  =    0,000000 1/Ca                                                
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 3.61 - Case 2 Realiability Assessment Results 
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3. Tripping off Producing Branches 
It is also worth noting that in the Øie-Kvinesdal grid you can achieve significant reduction in ENS by 
tripping the non-necessary lines connecting the generators and their transformers to the radial. To 
model this scenario we set up a grid similar to the base case, but pre-trip unnecessary branches. This 
creates a topology as displayed in figure 3.10. A distribution reliability assessment is then run as 
defined on the next page. 
 
Figure 3.10 - One Line Schematics of Pre-tripped Branches Containing Generators Removed 
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Calculation Method AC Load Flow. Balanced Positive Sequence x 
DC Load Flow (linear)  
Reactive Power Control Automatic Tap Adjustment of Transformers x 
Automatic Shunt Adjustment  
Consider Reactive Power Limits x 
Active Power Control As dispatched.  x 
According to Primary/Secondary Control  
According to inertias  
Considering Active Power Limits x 
Balancing of Production/Load By Reference Machine  
By Slack Bus x 
Distributed Slack by Loads  
Distributed Slack by Generation (Synch. Generators)  
Load Options Voltage dependencies checked at nearest bus x 
Table 3.62 - Load Flow Analysis Settings Case 3 
 
Method Connectivity Analysis  
Load Flow Analysis x 
Network Distribution x 
Transmission  
Contingency Definition Lines/Cables x 
Transformers x 
Common Mode  
Independent Second Failures  
Fault Clearance Breakers Use All Circuit Breakers  
Use Switches With Protection 
Devices Only 
x 
Switching Procedure Concurrently x 
Sequential  
Consider Sectionalizing x 
Time to open switches manually 60 min  
Voltage limits 0.9 p.u. < u < 1.1 p.u.  
Thermal Constraints Maximum thermal loading 100% 
Islanding Capability Black Start  
Ride Through  
Table 3.63 - Reliability Assessment Settings for Case 3 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| System Summary                                                                                                                   
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| System Average Interruption Frequency Index          :  SAIFI  =    2,000149 1/Ca                                                
| Customer Average Interruption Frequency Index        :  CAIFI  =    2,000149 1/Ca                                                
| System Average Interruption Duration Index           :  SAIDI  =    5,347    h/Ca                                                
| Customer Average Interruption Duration Index         :  CAIDI  =    2,673    h                                                   
| Average Service Availability Index                   :  ASAI   =    0,9993896575                                                 
| Average Service Unavailability Index                 :  ASUI   =    0,0006103425                                                 
| Energy Not Supplied                                  :  ENS    =   32,735    MWh/a                                               
| Average Energy Not Supplied                          :  AENS   =    6,547    MWh/Ca                                            
| Average Customer Curtailment Index                   :  ACCI   =    4,491    MWh/Ca                                              
| Expected Interruption Cost                           :  EIC    =    0,000    M$/a                                                
| Interrupted Energy Assessment Rate                   :  IEAR   =    0,000    $/kWh                                               
| System energy shed                                   :  SES    =    0,000    MWh/a                                               
| Average System Interruption Frequency Index          :  ASIFI  =    1,361905 1/a                                                 
| Average System Interruption Duration Index           :  ASIDI  =    2,992272 h/a                                                 
| Momentary Average Interruption Frequency Index       :  MAIFI  =    0,000000 1/Ca                                                
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 3.64 - Reliability Assessment Results for Case 3 
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As can be seen from table 3.64 the distribution option is checked and the only mitigating measure 
used for restoring power after a contingency in this simulation is sectionalizing. This makes the lower 
estimate easily defined as the ENS contribution from the choke point formed by the external grid and 
the main transformer and the sectionalizing time. It has to be noted as ever that there is an overlap 
between sectioning time and outage time when choke point is concerned. That is why this number is 
only an estimate.  
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In this calculation the 0.0066 [1/a] is the failure frequency of the transformer and 0.0346 [1/a*km] is 
the failure frequency per year per kilometer of the line. 65 [km] is the remaining line length in the 
grid. The choke point ENS was calculated to be 10.25 MWh/a in case 2. Adding these two gives us a 
total of 35.06 MWh/a. This is higher than the 32.735 MWh/a ENS calculated in the PF simulation. 
Possibly this is due to the previously mentioned overlap in sectioning time and repair time. Since the 
majority of the load is located close to the main transformer, we would not expect the topology to 
make a big contribution to ENS. This is because when a line further out in the radial is being repaired, 
the majority of the load will still be supplied from the external grid. This effect is enhanced by the 
fact that the longest line distances, and thus most of the line faults, are located further out in the 
radial.  
 
3.4.1 Summary of Øie-Kvinesdal Case Results 
- Case 1: Base case 
- Case 2: Islanding capabilities for DG units 
o Refitting circuit breakers with proper two way relay system 
o Sufficient AVR and frequency regulating mechanism for generators 
o Synchronization equipment for reconnecting to external grid 
o Engineered mass for generators 
o Telematics and independently supplied communication equipment for contacting net 
operator 
- Case 3: Tripping producing branches 
  ENS [MWh/a] 
 ENS in percentage 
of base case 
SAIFI [1/a] 
SAIFI as percentage 
of base case 
Case 1 48,883 - 2 - 
Case 2 32,289 66% 0,796 39,8% 
Case 3 32,735 67% 2 100% 
Table 3.65 - ENS and SAIFI summary for the Øie-Kvinesdal grid 
  
KILE 
[NOK/a] 
 KILE as percentage 
of base case 
Accumulated KILE over 20 years 
with 3% discount rate [NOK] 
Savings over 20 years 
from base case [NOK] 
Case 1 52 769 - 1 460 460 - 
Case 2 34 856 66,05 % 964 692 495 800 
Case 3 35 337 66,97 % 978 004 482 500 
Table 3.66 - KILE summary for the Øie-Kvinesdal grid 
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In the Øie-Kvinesdal case there are savings to be made from including an islanding function on the 
generators. This happens to coincide with the savings that can be made from removing the lines and 
transformers used to connect the DG units. The savings are in either case technically sufficient to 
introduce some sort of islanding, but in such a long grid islanding does not seem to make an impact 
in general. It should be noted that case 1 could also add the 1.3 [MWh/a] ENS from protection 
devices failing to trip on the base case to get an image on how much circuit breaker failure on 
generators has an impact on the grid. 
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3.5 Hitra 
The only non-radial grid in this paper is the Hitra complex. Test scenarios here will focus on 
establishing an islanding isolation capability at the Malnes transformer. The DG unit located at bus 90 
will then supply loads that are affiliated with bus 85 and 91. At bus 80 Hitra is connected to the main 
transmission grid and in normal operation mode this also acts as the swing bus. For this set of 
simulations the generator at bus 90 will be put as swing bus as this will be its acting roll when an 
error occurs in the main part of the Hitra grid. The lines are not modeled as detailed as they are in 
the original Simpow as all details are not given in the data material.   
 
 
Figure 3.11 - Hitra One Line Schematics 
The load points and their placements are presented in table 3.68. These are the original load point 
settings as presented in the original Simpow simulations. When different scenarios are modeled they 
will be presented as scalars of these settings, meaning that the proportionality if the loads will be 
intact. Line data for Hitra are somewhat detailed, but is presented in the appendix and will remain 
the same for all modeling scenarios.  
At bus 1 a wind farm is connected. This wind farm is a more intricately constructed system of lines, 
transformers and nodes. But for simplicity and since this paper can’t disclose the original topology, a 
version where all the 24 wind mills are connected to bus 2 as per figure 3.11 is utilized. It’s worth 
noting that by doing this we are unable to see how this wind farm topology affects the reliability of 
supply at Hitra.  
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 Bus number Active Load [MW] Reactive Load [MVAr]  
Malnes 85 0.8 0.16 
Vikstrøm 86 11.28 2.28 
Fillan 71 7.5 1.5 
Snillfjord 87 0.84 0.16 
Agdenes 84 2.32 0.48 
Orkdal 80 - - 
Hemne 83 4.48 1.08 
Utheim 88 11.4 2.32 
Ålmo 88 8.6 1.72 
Eide 88 5.2 1.36 
Total - 54.03 11.6 
Table 3.67 - Load data for Hitra 
Reliability Data 
The reliability data that will be used for this net is the same as that logged at NTE Nett. The average 
repair duration of the external grid is increased a little to imitate the fact that it’s an underwater 
cable. It should also be noted that the transformer average repair duration used here is logged for 
distribution transformers, which 
normally have somewhat different 
reliability characteristics than say 
windmill transformers or HV 
transformers. Table 3.69 shows 
the reliability characteristics used. 
These characteristics are mostly estimates based on logged empirical data from Statnett (23). The 
estimates are produced by looking at general fault statistics for the type of component, then multiply 
that fault frequency by the percentage of faults that normally cause interruption in supply. Repair 
durations are also found in the Statnett statistics, and are estimated by calculating weighted 
averages of the Statnett numbers. 
 
1. Base Case 
The base case for Hitra will be a normal load as according to table 3.68 and no dispatch from the 
generators. Transformers and lines connecting the wind park and the generator at bus 90 to the grid 
will be out of service so they won’t be a part of the contingency list. Since the grid contains meshed 
structures, a distribution analysis won’t be applicable to any analysis. Thermal limits will not be 
considered since thermal limit data was not provided with the original dataset. If the lines have an 
ampere limit of below 300 A this would have started to affect the analysis results. The same line type 
is used in the critical meshed line structure in the middle as in the line connecting the wind mill park 
to the rest of the grid. If the transformer and the line connected to it are in the same capacity range, 
the line type holds around 700 A. 700 A is more than enough to enable each of the lines in the 
meshed structure of Hitra to hold the complete power flow necessary to export the maximum wind 
farm production or supply the heavy load scenario for bus 71 and 86. This paper will therefor assume 
thermal limit induced ENS is negligible.  
 Interruption Frequency Outage Duration 
Line 0.09625  [1/a*km] 3.55    [h] 
Cable 0.0725    [1/a*km] 5.5      [h] 
Transformer 0.0066    [1/a] 6         [h] 
External Grid 0.22        [1/a] 2.675 [h] 
Table 3.68 - Reliability Data for Components in Hitra 
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Calculation Method AC Load Flow. Balanced Positive Sequence x 
DC Load Flow (linear)  
Reactive Power Control Automatic Tap Adjustment of Transformers x 
Automatic Shunt Adjustment  
Consider Reactive Power Limits x 
Active Power Control As dispatched.  x 
According to Primary/Secondary Control  
According to inertias  
Considering Active Power Limits  
Balancing of Production/Load By Reference Machine  
By Slack Bus x 
Distributed Slack by Loads  
Distributed Slack by Generation (Synch. Generators)  
Load Options Voltage dependencies checked at nearest bus x 
Table 3.69 - Case 1 Load Flow Analysis Settings 
Method Connectivity Analysis  
Load Flow Analysis x 
Network Distribution  
Transmission X 
Contingency Definition Lines/Cables X 
Transformers X 
Common Mode  
Independent Second Failures  
Fault Clearance Breakers Use All Circuit Breakers  
Use Switches With Protection 
Devices Only 
X 
Switching Procedure Concurrently X 
Sequential  
Consider Sectionalizing  
Time to open switches manually 60 min  
Voltage limits 0.9 p.u. < u < 1.1 p.u.  
Thermal Constraints Maximum thermal loading 100% 
Islanding Capability Black Start  
Ride Through  
Table 3.70 - Case 1 Reliability Assessment Settings 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| System Summary                                                                                                                   
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| System Average Interruption Frequency Index          :  SAIFI  =   12,723560 1/Ca                                                
| Customer Average Interruption Frequency Index        :  CAIFI  =   12,723560 1/Ca                                                
| System Average Interruption Duration Index           :  SAIDI  =   21,301    h/Ca                                                
| Customer Average Interruption Duration Index         :  CAIDI  =    1,674    h                                                   
| Average Service Availability Index                   :  ASAI   =    0,9975683490                                                 
| Average Service Unavailability Index                 :  ASUI   =    0,0024316510                                                 
| Energy Not Supplied                                  :  ENS    = 1037,015    MWh/a                                               
| Average Energy Not Supplied                          :  AENS   =  103,701    MWh/Ca                                              
| Average Customer Curtailment Index                   :  ACCI   =    0,000    MWh/Ca                                              
| Expected Interruption Cost                           :  EIC    =    0,000    M$/a                                                
| Interrupted Energy Assessment Rate                   :  IEAR   =    0,000    $/kWh                                               
| System energy shed                                   :  SES    =    0,000    MWh/a                                               
| Average System Interruption Frequency Index          :  ASIFI  =   10,753660 1/a                                                 
| Average System Interruption Duration Index           :  ASIDI  =   19,193317 h/a                                                 
| Momentary Average Interruption Frequency Index       :  MAIFI  =    0,000000 1/Ca                                                
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 3.71 - Case 1 Reliability Assessment Results 
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The ENS shown in table 3.72 has no trivially calculated lower bound as there is a circuit breaker 
dividing the loads into roughly equal halves in two different circuit breaker zones. We can note that 
the ASIF index value is roughly eight times the size of the other grids modeled in this paper. Without 
empirical data from the net operator we can’t conclude on the quality of these numbers, but the line 
interruption frequency might be too high.  
2. Base case with dispatched generators and no islanding 
This case will look at how the grid handles dispatched generators and how these will affect the yearly 
ENS. Protection failure in generators will also be estimated and added on later to give an impression 
on how this affects the grid as a whole. In the PF model the wind farm has been implemented as the 
structure shown in figure 3.11, but in 
will be treated as a virtual power plant 
without the ability to be set as a 
reference machine. The wind farm 
dispatch is set to 46% which is enough to 
supply the whole circuit breaker zone 
behind the circuit breaker isolating bus 
75 from bus 76. Such a setup is not considered in reality for Hitra, since the islanded zone would have 
almost 90% wind penetration. However, due to the meshed structure of the Hitra grid, it is very 
difficult to model a case where the generators are not dispatched as if they had an islanding 
capability (since the “distribution” option is not available for meshed structures).  
Calculation Method AC Load Flow. Balanced Positive Sequence x 
DC Load Flow (linear)  
Reactive Power Control Automatic Tap Adjustment of Transformers x 
Automatic Shunt Adjustment  
Consider Reactive Power Limits x 
Active Power Control As dispatched.  x 
According to Primary/Secondary Control  
According to inertias  
Considering Active Power Limits  
Balancing of Production/Load By Reference Machine x 
By Slack Bus  
Distributed Slack by Loads  
Distributed Slack by Generation (Synch. Generators)  
Load Options Voltage dependencies checked at nearest bus x 
Table 3.73 - Case 2 Load Flow Analysis Settings 
As can be seen from table 3.75 on the next page, a 43% reduction in ENS is achieved by running 
Svartelva as a reference machine and utilizing the wind farm as a base production. This does not 
include effects from protection failure. A rough calculation using our default DG unit reliability data 
and protection device data gives us the following ENS contribution from the reference machine.  
                 [
           
 
]                   
   
 
   
 Bus 
Placement 
Dispatch 
[MW] [MVAr] 
Svartelva hydro unit 90 2 -2.2 
Wind farm 2 22.02 0.78 
External Grid 80 31.21 3.23 
Table 3.72 - Case 2 Generator Dispatch 
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--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| System Summary                                                                                                                   
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| System Average Interruption Frequency Index          :  SAIFI  =   10,462437 1/Ca                                                
| Customer Average Interruption Frequency Index        :  CAIFI  =   10,462437 1/Ca                                                
| System Average Interruption Duration Index           :  SAIDI  =   11,407    h/Ca                                                
| Customer Average Interruption Duration Index         :  CAIDI  =    1,090    h                                                   
| Average Service Availability Index                   :  ASAI   =    0,9986978663                                                 
| Average Service Unavailability Index                 :  ASUI   =    0,0013021337                                                 
| Energy Not Supplied                                  :  ENS    =  596,063    MWh/a                                               
| Average Energy Not Supplied                          :  AENS   =   59,606    MWh/Ca                                              
| Average Customer Curtailment Index                   :  ACCI   =    0,000    MWh/Ca                                              
| Expected Interruption Cost                           :  EIC    =    0,000    M$/a                                                
| Interrupted Energy Assessment Rate                   :  IEAR   =    0,000    $/kWh                                               
| System energy shed                                   :  SES    =    0,000    MWh/a                                               
| Average System Interruption Frequency Index          :  ASIFI  =    9,885986 1/a                                                 
| Average System Interruption Duration Index           :  ASIDI  =   11,032069 h/a                                                 
| Momentary Average Interruption Frequency Index       :  MAIFI  =    0,000000 1/Ca                                                
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 3.74 - Case 2 Reliability Assessment Results 
 
Method Connectivity Analysis  
Load Flow Analysis x 
Network Distribution  
Transmission X 
Contingency Definition Lines/Cables X 
Transformers X 
Common Mode  
Independent Second Failures  
Fault Clearance Breakers Use All Circuit Breakers  
Use Switches With Protection 
Devices Only 
X 
Switching Procedure Concurrently X 
Sequential  
Consider Sectionalizing  
Time to open switches manually 60 min  
Voltage limits 0.9 p.u. < u < 1.1 p.u.  
Thermal Constraints Maximum thermal loading 100% 
Islanding Capability Black Start  
Ride Through x 
Table 3.75 - Case 2 Reliability Assessment Settings 
 
In the previous pages calculation 1.3% is the protection failure rate, 22 MW is the total load in the 
same circuit breaker zone as the DG unit and 5 is the number of interruptions per year experienced 
by the generator. 1 hour is the sectioning time required to trip the generator using a disconnector. 
Using the same principle to calculate the ENS contribution from the wind farm would give us an ENS 
contribution of 24*1.42[MWh/a] = 34.08 [MWh/a]. 
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    3. Islanding at the Malnes transformer 
The original intent for islanding in the Hitra grid was to put bus 85, 91 and 90 in a circuit breaker zone 
to create an island to support the 0.8 MW and 1.61 MW load during an outage. The Svartelva 
generator is set to be the IPS in this 
island. Figure 3.12 shows the placement 
for the circuit breaker which isolates this 
circuit breaker zone, now dubbed the 
Malnes radial. Due to difficulties with 
the load flow it was not possible to run a 
scenario where only the Malnes radial was islanded. Many of the contingency scenarios got load flow 
equation sets that would not converge when this was tried. These contingencies are then removed 
from the contingency list without adding anything to the ENS index.  
 
Figure 3.12 - New One Line Schematics for Case 3. Circuit Breaker Added Between Bus 85 and Transformer 
As can be seen from table 3.80 on the next page the ENS is decreased markedly by 13.6%.  However, 
if simulations are done without islanding the Malnes radial we can see that the islanding properties 
are only contributing 12.6 MWh/a (non-islanding reliability assessment results are shown in table 
3.82). This is a relevant amount compared to the total load in the Malnes radial, but compared to the 
whole system it’s not a big improvement.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Bus 
Placement 
Dispatch 
[MW] [MVAr] 
Svartelva DG unit 90 2 -2.2 
Wind farm 2 24 0.78 
External Grid 80 29.32 3.58 
Table 3.76 - Production Dispatch for Case 3 
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Calculation Method AC Load Flow. Balanced Positive Sequence x 
DC Load Flow (linear)  
Reactive Power Control Automatic Tap Adjustment of Transformers x 
Automatic Shunt Adjustment  
Consider Reactive Power Limits x 
Active Power Control As dispatched.  x 
According to Primary/Secondary Control  
According to inertias  
Considering Active Power Limits  
Balancing of Production/Load By Reference Machine x 
By Slack Bus  
Distributed Slack by Loads  
Distributed Slack by Generation (Synch. Generators)  
Load Options Voltage dependencies checked at nearest bus x 
Table 3.77 - Case 3 Load FLow Analysis Settings 
Method Connectivity Analysis  
Load Flow Analysis x 
Network Distribution  
Transmission X 
Contingency Definition Lines/Cables X 
Transformers X 
Common Mode  
Independent Second Failures  
Fault Clearance Breakers Use All Circuit Breakers  
Use Switches With Protection 
Devices Only 
X 
Switching Procedure Concurrently X 
Sequential  
Consider Sectionalizing  
Time to open switches manually 60 min  
Voltage limits 0.9 p.u. < u < 1.1 p.u.  
Thermal Constraints Maximum thermal loading 100% 
Islanding Capability Black Start  
Ride Through x 
Table 3.78 - Case 3 Reliability Assessment Settings 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| System Summary                                                                                                                   
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| System Average Interruption Frequency Index          :  SAIFI  =    3,836045 1/Ca                                                
| Customer Average Interruption Frequency Index        :  CAIFI  =    3,836045 1/Ca                                                
| System Average Interruption Duration Index           :  SAIDI  =    9,384    h/Ca                                                
| Customer Average Interruption Duration Index         :  CAIDI  =    2,446    h                                                   
| Average Service Availability Index                   :  ASAI   =    0,9989287542                                                 
| Average Service Unavailability Index                 :  ASUI   =    0,0010712458                                                 
| Energy Not Supplied                                  :  ENS    =  515,141    MWh/a                                               
| Average Energy Not Supplied                          :  AENS   =   51,514    MWh/Ca                                              
| Average Customer Curtailment Index                   :  ACCI   =   52,814    MWh/Ca                                              
| Expected Interruption Cost                           :  EIC    =    0,000    M$/a                                                
| Interrupted Energy Assessment Rate                   :  IEAR   =    0,000    $/kWh                                               
| System energy shed                                   :  SES    =    0,000    MWh/a                                               
| Average System Interruption Frequency Index          :  ASIFI  =    4,219844 1/a                                                 
| Average System Interruption Duration Index           :  ASIDI  =    9,534349 h/a                                                 
| Momentary Average Interruption Frequency Index       :  MAIFI  =    0,000000 1/Ca                                                
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 3.79 - Case 3 Reliability Assessment Results  
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--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| System Summary                                                                                                                   
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| System Average Interruption Frequency Index          :  SAIFI  =   10,242372 1/Ca                                                
| Customer Average Interruption Frequency Index        :  CAIFI  =   10,242372 1/Ca                                                
| System Average Interruption Duration Index           :  SAIDI  =   11,187    h/Ca                                                
| Customer Average Interruption Duration Index         :  CAIDI  =    1,092    h                                                   
| Average Service Availability Index                   :  ASAI   =    0,9987229879                                                 
| Average Service Unavailability Index                 :  ASUI   =    0,0012770121                                                 
| Energy Not Supplied                                  :  ENS    =  527,722    MWh/a                                               
| Average Energy Not Supplied                          :  AENS   =   52,772    MWh/Ca                                              
| Average Customer Curtailment Index                   :  ACCI   =    0,000    MWh/Ca                                              
| Expected Interruption Cost                           :  EIC    =    0,000    M$/a                                                
| Interrupted Energy Assessment Rate                   :  IEAR   =    0,000    $/kWh                                               
| System energy shed                                   :  SES    =    0,000    MWh/a                                               
| Average System Interruption Frequency Index          :  ASIFI  =    8,621123 1/a                                                 
| Average System Interruption Duration Index           :  ASIDI  =    9,767206 h/a                                                 
| Momentary Average Interruption Frequency Index       :  MAIFI  =    0,000000 1/Ca                                                
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 3.80 - Case 3 Reliability Assessment Without Islanding 
 
3.5.1 Summary of Results of Hitra Cases 
- Case 1: Base case 
- Case 2: Base case with dispatched generators and no islanding 
- Case 3: Dispatched generators and Islanding of the Malnes transformer 
o Refitting circuit breakers with proper two way relay system 
o Sufficient AVR and frequency regulating mechanism for generators 
o Synchronization equipment for reconnecting to external grid 
o Engineered mass for generators 
o Telematics and independently supplied communication equipment for contacting net 
operator 
  ENS [MWh/a] 
 ENS in percentage 
of base case 
SAIFI [1/a] 
SAIFI as percentage 
of base case 
Case 1 1037 - 12,72 - 
Case 2 596 57,5% 10,46 82,2% 
Case 3 515 49,7% 3,83 30,1% 
Table 3.81 - ENS and SAIFI summary for the Hitra grid 
  
KILE 
[NOK/a] 
 KILE as percentage 
of base case 
Accumulated KILE over 20 years 
with 3% discount rate [NOK] 
Savings over 20 years 
of base case [NOK] 
Case 1 1 119 450 - 30 982 442 - 
Case 2 643 386 57,47 % 17 806 663 13 175 799  
Case 3 555 946 49,66 % 15 386 632 15 596 000 
Table 3.82 -KILE summary for the Hitra grid 
This grid and the available data were not ideal for stating sound conclusions about the aptness of 
islanding procedures as a means to decrease ENS. The initial ENS from the base case justifies 
investments of 31 million NOK, and that is a low estimate if we assume that the expected ENS is 
correct. When initially building up the Hitra model circuit breakers were put into different parts of 
the meshed structure in the middle of the Hitra grid, and big reductions in ENS were accomplished 
with relatively small investments in equipment. This leads me to suspect that the failure 
characteristics used are wrong as they were not provided by the net operator. Either that or the net 
operator has a big potential for both saving money and increase uptime for the wind farm by 
investing in one or two circuit breakers.   
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The second case assumes that the wind farm working as an islanding generator. This is done for 
modeling purposes. The third case the Malnes generator is set as the reference machine in an 
islanding system alongside the wind farm. The difference in savings accumulate to 2,42 million NOK 
which is then the estimate of how much impact the Malnes generator islanding is saving in KILE. The 
number, however, is too high due to the influence of the wind farm.   
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4. Discussion 
 
4.1 Criticism of Analysis Data Material and Sensitivity Analysis 
To start of the discussion a few notes should be made on the reliability of the data and models 
themselves. The uncertainties with regards to how mitigating measures were chosen and performed 
have been discussed with some gravity in this text. But in truth, the reliability data that has been the 
basis for these test cases are an even bigger factor when judging the validity of the analysis. Data 
that has been used in most cases are taken directly from the net operator that is responsible for the 
grid in question. This data suggest very low failure frequencies and outage durations for lines and 
cables in general. But at the same time, it suggests a very high failure frequency for the external grid, 
regardless of whether or not it is regional or transmission. This paper does not have sufficient 
material to properly question the material delivered by the net operator, but the Statnett statistics 
seem to suggest much lower interruption frequencies from the transmission/regional grid. 
Regardless of the quality of the reliability data used in this analysis, islanding generators cases 
simulated here deliver much better results when line failure characteristics are low and external grid 
failure characteristics are high. A slight local increase in the statistics for interruption frequencies for 
the lines in most cases modeled here, and a slight decrease in the interruption frequency of the 
external grid would greatly shift the balance. A sensitivity analysis of Line A, which is the most 
detailed grid available for this paper, suggests almost no effect of islanding generators if failure 
characteristics closer to the Statnett statistics are used. There is a big difference between the net 
operator failure characteristic and the Statnett characteristic. The net operator numbers are almost 
tenfold that of the Statnett numbers, and the line statistic that Statnett operates with are almost five 
times bigger than the net operator statistics. The Hitra grid has the longest total line length of about 
200km and should therefore be the most affected of variation in the reliability. But it is difficult to do 
a proper sensitivity analysis of it due to its non-radial structure. Øie-Kvinesdal has a radial structure 
and the next highest total line length of 70 km. The islanding generator has a markedly smaller 
impact on Øie-Kvinesdal than on Line A. Where Line A gets reductions to about 8% Øie-Kvinesdal 
experiences a slightly lower than 40% reduction. Increasing the interruption frequency of the line 
types in Øie-Kvinesdal by 30% increases the ENS to about 60% of the base case.  
It could also be noted that the average reduction in indices experienced by the islanding practices at 
Boston Bar reduced the indices by 50%. This corresponds ok with the results experienced in these 
modeling scenarios. This could be taken as a sign of validity.  
 
4.2 How DG affects reliability of supply in today’s grid 
This paper has had some problems with regards to the analysis of failure in protection devices. This is 
further hampered by the fact that little or no data could be found on DG unit reliability 
characteristics in a Norwegian setting. Data on reliability characteristics for circuit breakers in 
Norway is also scarce. Even so, from the material that has been modeled in this paper there are a 
few points that can be made. In the distribution nets modeled here there has normally been a circuit 
breaker separating the external grid and the DG units. The exception is the Hitra grid, which also 
contains meshed structures. The consequence of this single circuit breaker zone is that the impact of 
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DG units and its circuit breaker on the ENS has a relatively linear relation with the size of the 
interruption frequencies and interruption duration. The DG units used here have had an average of 
250 hours expected outage duration and an interruption frequency of about five interruptions a year. 
If we state that 50 hours is a plausible average repair duration the connection from interruption 
frequency and failure to trip probability relates to ENS roughly like this: 
                    . Here a is some constant based on grid topology and total load,      the 
interruption frequency of the generator and         the probability of failure to trip in the circuit 
breaker. This means that doubling both the failure to trip and interruption frequency of the 
generator will result in a four times higher ENS addition. No grid modeled in this paper has had 
significantly more than 3% impact on ENS from DG units and their respective transformer/line 
connection to the grid it. This suggests that even big DG penetration in a distribution net does not 
increase ENS by more than 12%.  
If deep costs are applied to DG operators a 12% increase in ENS could have big impact on margins for 
that producer. However, a three percent increase is still a rather large estimate on the magnitude of 
the impact DG production is having on the grids modeled here. No matter, there are many factors 
that need to be taken into account when assessing the impact of DG units in distribution grids. A net 
with a bigger total load will also have bigger ENS impacts of generators (a bigger a in the ENS formula 
above). These same grids might also be better suited for DG production for this very same reason 
since the power sink is close to the power source.  
4.3 Assessment of Islanding Mode Enabled Generators’ Impact on Grid 
ENS and KILE 
- With the data material available for this paper and assuming the models are representative, 
there seems to be a relatively big potential for reducing ENS in general in the Norwegian grid. 
However, considering that the models presented here do not clearly indicate that investing in 
preventive measures is profitable, a lack of real life investment in these measures seems 
legitimate. No cost estimates have been worked out for islanding measure installations in 
Norway to my knowledge. Neither are there companies specializing in this field offering cheap 
“retail” solutions for islanding measures. Some of the cases modeled experienced improved ENS 
using other tried and proven methods just as well as by implementing controlled islanding. 
Considering this it seems more likely that if islanding was to be implemented in Norway, it would 
have to be as a subsidized research project. Having said that, the KILE costs operated with in this 
paper is a lower bound estimate assuming ENS calculations are correct. If, for example, industry 
or retail businesses were affected the possibility of saving money would drastically increase due 
to increased KILE rates. 
-  It should also be noted that the effectiveness of islanding increases drastically when the “choke 
point” failure characteristics increase. By choke point it is meant external grid fallout, main 
transformer connecting the grid to the external line or any line/cable connecting the grid to the 
external grid. From the Danish paper (13) on island control it was pointed out geographical (non-
power) islands connected to land by cable with sea traffic in the strait between land were often 
very prone to “choke point” fallouts and these islands were considered as very good targets for 
controlled islanding projects in Denmark. Main land Denmark has a smaller geographical area 
combined with a bigger population. The Danish islands are also more habitable than Norwegian 
ones and contain more people and thus also load. However, it should be possible to find 
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geographical islands in Norway with better properties for islanding generators than the ones 
used for modeling in this paper and thus find grids much more applicable for islanding than the 
grids tested here.  
- The Hitra model sticks out from the other modeled grids in this paper. The potential reducing 
ENS by investing in preventive measures in this grid is substantial according to the model. 
Installing two circuit breakers could reduce the twenty year KILE by several million NOK. This 
should maybe be taken more as an argument against the Hitra models validity. In general this 
paper would have benefitted from knowing more about real life KILE and ENS of net operators 
so as to do evaluations of models and how they perform. The exception of this is Line A, where 
the net operator has confirmed the base case ENS to be very precise. 
- It seems like refitting existing grids would be technically more difficult and more expensive. 
Appropriate circuit breaker zones could be chosen if the islanding mode was considered from 
the beginning of the planning process. Engineering the mass of an already implemented 
generator is probably technically challenging and expensive, especially if the generator is some 
sort of retail type product. Implementing the correct AVR and circuit breaker relay systems 
correctly from the start would reduce costs. This is not a surprising conclusion, but it should be 
noted in the paper. 
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5. Conclusion 
In this thesis it was briefly pointed out that in small scale distributed power production in 
Scandinavia, the driving forces of expansion are state regulations. State regulations requiring power 
producers to produce power within the green certificates scheme and reduce    -emissions in 
Norway. To reduce costs resulting from these regulations the potential benefits of decentralized 
power production has been evaluated. Increasing the quality of supply will reduce compensation 
costs for net operators. In this evaluation it was concluded that increasing quality of supply through 
islanding systems was feasible.  
An experimental project in Canada conducted by BC Hydro has developed eight guidelines for how 
they implemented islanding generators in one of their radials. These guidelines were used as a 
benchmark for describing technical and economical requirements in this thesis. Under the conditions 
described by BC Hydro, the Boston Bar islanding test project was determined a success.  
The current implication of distributed generation in distribution grids has been difficult to estimate 
properly in PowerFactory. This is mostly due to lack of empirical data from Norwegian settings and 
because PowerFactory uses different standards for input data on protection mechanism failure than 
what is used in the Scandinavian standard for logging statistics. From the analysis results that were 
produced the implications on indices were minor. Even within large margins of error and high 
estimates on interruption frequencies in generators, the impact does not go above a 10% increase in 
ENS. In the models ENS increase due to protection failure in generators is estimated to be on average 
between 1-3%. There has not been conducted extensive investigation to assess the economic 
implications of this on DG operators, which could be notable if margins were small. The production 
to load ratio in the grid, the failure characteristics of the equipment as well as the number of 
generators the ENS impact of generators and their respective  in a grid.  
The models analyzed in this paper responded for the most part well to islanding measures intended 
to reduce ENS. In general the indices were lowered to between 10-60% of base case indices. 
Compared to the 500 000 CND incremental costs incurred at Boston Bar no grid was able to reduce 
costs enough to justify investments. The expenses related to islanding are very uncertain, and it is 
pointed out that there are many things which could reduce costs and increase savings. The most 
effective of these is to find a radial with high choke point failure characteristic and a sufficiently high 
load.  
 
5.1 Further Work 
 
Other more optimal grids modeled 
The best way of answering questions regarding the plausibility of islanding in Norway is to find more 
optimal Norwegian case grids and model them. More optimal grids implies that they respond better 
to implementing islanding generators. Characteristics of such grids would be grids with big loads, 
high fault characteristics at the main choke point or other choke points and potential for DG unit 
installation or existing DG units. The grids chosen for this paper were more often chosen because of 
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the availability of data sets on these grids. Some of them, like the Hitra grid, were considered for 
islanding already by the net operator but proved difficult to model precisely with the data quality 
available. These more optimal grids would tell us something about the upper limit of developing 
islanding systems and thus the profitability/efficiency of developing competence/systems for 
implementing islanding DG units. 
Expanding on legal issues   
Legal issues have been briefly discussed in this paper, but there are many issues that are vague, not 
defined or defined between partners locally. If we limit the legal issues to islanding the issues of 
sovereignty with regards to ownership and operation of the DG unit. This could be especially relevant 
in an islanding situation. What level of power quality can be expected in islanding mode? What 
would be sensible to include in a commissioning process? 
More detailed analysis 
Technical analysis of critical contingency topologies with regards to dynamic analysis of voltage 
response to for example black start or ride through scenarios would be crucial to understand 
whether or not the proposed islanding grids are actually possible to run as islands. More crucially, 
how will the system frequency respond to different events in the islanded grid? What are the 
consequences of such frequency and voltage responses to electric equipment in that same grid? 
Modeling these things for at least some of the critical cases would be useful for shedding light on the 
possibilities of islanding in Norway. 
  
Modeling with better reliability data 
Acquiring a proper set of reliability data for grids to be modeled is perhaps the single most effort that 
could be made to improve precision on analysis results drastically. As mentioned before the failure 
characteristics of choke points between loads and the external grid are very important to analyze the 
impact of islanding mode on total ENS. The numbers provided by the net operators have either been 
suspiciously high and the numbers used when net operator characteristics were not available were 
generic at best. If the net operator numbers is proved to be a better match for most other 
distribution grids, a lot of distribution grids could suddenly become very profitable to run in island 
mode. However, judging from Statnett statistics it is not very likely that this is the case. Regardless of 
this, further research on reliability statistics for specific areas would make analysis results markedly 
more precise.   
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APPENDIX 
Snåsa 
 
Table A.1 – Line and cable data for the Snåsa grid 
 
Table A.2 - Transformer data for the Snåsa grid 
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Øie-Kvinesdal 
 
Table A.3 - Parameters for synchronous generators in the Øie-Kvinesdal radial 
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Figure A.3 -  Base case heavy load on Snåsa grid. Basic load flow results 
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Line A 
 
Figure A.1 - Line A model in PF 
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Correspondings 
Hei igjen! 
  
Da ser det faktisk ut som du treffer veldig bra sammenlignet med våre egne tall. LPENS vil bli høyere 
i din analyse ettersom man forutsetter at lastene ikke varierer gjennom året. 
  
Så dette lover bra  
  
Med vennlig hilsen 
 
Rune Paulsen 
overingeniør 
NTE Nett AS 
7736 Steinkjer 
 
Fil: Resultater – NetBas.txt 
Figure A.2 - Mail 1 Rune Paulsen 
Hei! 
  
Beklager sen tilbakemelding. Vedlagt er lastflyt for Snåsa på samme format som du tidligere har fått 
for Frol-avgangen i Levanger. I tillegg har jeg vedlagt et enlinjeskjema for Snåsa-nettet fra NetBas, 
men som sist gang kan det være noe vanskelig å lese alt i enlinjeskjemaet. 
  
Når det gjelder pålitelighetsdata for Snåsa, så kan du bruke samme underlaget som du fikk tilsendt 
ifm. Frol-linjen. Det er de samme dataene som benyttes i dag. Vi har dessverre ikke loggført 
seksjoneringstider på mange år, så jeg har ingen gode tall å gi deg for Snåsai den sammenheng. Så 
der blir du bare nødt til å estimere noe. 
  
Håper dette var til hjelp. Ta kontakt om du har behov for noe annet eller dersom du har andre 
spørsmål. 
  
Med vennlig hilsen 
  
Rune Paulsen 
overingeniør 
NTE Nett AS 
7736 Steinkjer 
 
Figure A.3 - Mail 2 Rune Paulsen 
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Hei 
NVE har ingen generell regel mot ikke å tillate reguleringer for småkraftverk, men det er ikke så 
mange som søke om det. 
Det kan skyldes flere forhold, som flere og/eller andre grunneiere, allmenne interesser rundt eller i 
tiknytning til vannet eller at viktige biologiske verdier blir berørt. 
  
Det forekommer fra tid til annen at vi får søknader som innebærer reguleringer og noen har vi sagt 
ja til når ulempene er begrenset. Vi er klar over de fordelene du nevner, men i mange tilfelle vil slike 
magasiner være så små at de i mindre grad vil kunne bidra til sikker forsyning ved utfall, i hvert fall 
ikke over særlig tid. De kan imidlertid få en lenger driftstid i kraftverket året sett under ett, og 
dermed gi et positivt bidrag i en utbygging. 
  
mvh 
  
Øystein Grundt 
Norges vassdrags- og energidirektorat (NVE)  
Seksjonssjef 
Seksjon for småkraftverk og vassdragsinngrep 
 
Figure A.4 - Mail 1 Øystein Grundt 
 
